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I believed in the 1970 Clean Air Act' as a valuable reform
and worked for its implementation when I was an attorney for the
Natural Resources Defense Council. Now, after several years of
reflection and the benefit of hindsight, I think that the 1970 Act
was a mistake because it is based upon an important misconcep-
tion about how statutes can work to achieve their goals.
The Act ordains that its environmental goals must be
achieved.2 It purports to realize those goals not by stating rules of
conduct for pollutors but by mandating a process under which en-
tities other than Congress must promulgate controls to achieve the
goals. The 1970 Act is, in the first instance, a law that regulates
government rather than sources of pollution. It requires govern-
ment-both federal and state-to take certain actions by certain
dates. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must iden-
tify all harmful pollutants, classify them on the basis of prevalence
and impact, and then ensure that emissions are subjected to fed-
eral and/or state controls to the extent necessary to protect health
and welfare.3 Every step is framed in terms of "shall." 4 If a duty
should go unfulfilled, private citizens have specific authority to
enforce the Act in federal district court.5
The Act's regulatory system allows controls to vary from re-
gion to region and source to source so that mandatory goals can
be achieved with some sensitivity to economic costs and other
concerns.6 This regulatory system is not the only conceivable leg-
islative approach to air pollution. In contrast, for example, Con-
gress might enact rules that require all sources of a certain type
wherever located to reduce their emissions to a given rate. Limi-
tations on legislative time would, however, require that such rules
be more general than the fine-tuned controls promulgated under
the Act. Such legislated rules might seem undesirable because
they would reduce emissions in areas where the air was already
clean enough and may well not clean the air enough in areas with
heavy concentrations of sources. Furthermore, whatever the de-
sired degree of cleanliness in the air, the controls crafted by dele-
I. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Act], comprehensively restructured prior law. See infra
notes 14-33 and accompanying text. The Act, with subsequent amendments, is codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. IV 1980). See general,y D. CURRIE, AIR POL-
LUTION §§ 1.08-.12 (1981).
2. For a description of the Act, see infra § II(A)-(B).
3. See infra § II(A).
4. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 324-25
(2d Cir. 1976).
5. See infra note 163.
6. See infra text accompanying note 128.
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gates could theoretically allocate the reductions in emissions
among sources with an eye towards minimizing economic costs,
social impacts, and inequities.
The Act makes the protection of public health an absolute
goal even though there is no threshold of emissions below which
pollution does no harm.7 Thus, the Act generally precludes trade-
offs between health and other concerns such as economic or tech-
nological feasibilityA This approach has been subject to criticism.
Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, for example, recently sug-
gested that the Act could be more efficient if EPA had even more
flexibility to impose controls and if the Act's goals were made less
absolute.9 Ackerman and Hassler would refine the Act by chang-
ing its health goal from complete to more relative protection, such
as saving a given number of lives from air pollution.' 0 The Rea-
gan Administration and some major industries also view the man-
date to achieve an absolute health goal as a source of inefficiency,
but they would refine the Act by giving EPA and the states more
discretion as to how much should be done to achieve the Act's
goals. I I
In my view, both the 1970 Act and the proposals to make it
more efficient try to be too refined. As will be shown, the Act's
process is extremely complex, creating high transaction costs for
governments and businesses. The Act's enforcement also requires
more data about pollution effects and controls than science can
provide, thereby allowing manipulation that undercuts achieve-
ment of the Act's ultimate goals, wastes resources, and creates in-
equities. Finally, the Act fails to allocate among sources the
burden of cleaning the air or even to decide, in meaningful terms,
how clean the air should be. The legislation's backers can take
credit for bestowing environmental benefits while distancing
themselves from the costs and leaving an issue that is critical to
the nation's health and economy chronically unresolved.
The efficiency promised by the 1970 Act and the proposals to
make it more efficient are thus overshadowed by the difficulties
encountered in implementing this sophisticated legal scheme. It
would be better for Congress to forego the theoretical benefits of
fine-tuned pollution controls and instead itself prescribe emission
limits for major industries. Statutes must be judged not only by
the theoretical desirability of the duties that they would impose,
but also by the costs, feasibility, and fairness of the process for
7. See infra text accompanying notes 136-140.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 112-114.
9. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89
YALE L.J. 1466, 1566-71 (1980).
10. Id. at 1568-69.
11. See infra text accompanying note 56.
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converting statutory language into enforced duties. Stating rules
of conduct in the statute itself forces the legislature to make the
key decisions.
A. The Problem For Congress in 1970
Southern California smog kept children home from school
and threatened worse. From Boston to Washington, a summer
long siege of "daily pollution alerts" left "little doubt. . . that the
country was facing an air pollution crisis."1 2 A Senate Committee
found that the problem was "more severe, more pervasive, and
growing at a more rapid rate than was generally believed."'
13
By 1970, it was clear that decisions about air pollution had to
be made at the federal level. Neither air pollution nor industries
in search of profitable locations were confined by state bounda-
ries. A federal decision would, however, require politically diffi-
cult choices. Any set of pollution controls would be criticized as
going too far or not far enough. Nothing pointed to any particular
level of controls as especially efficient or fair. The situation called
for compromises that would satisfy no one.
Congress was in no position to pass the buck. It had already
enacted a series of statutes that handed the problem to states and
various federal agencies. Congress in 1955 declared that air pollu-
tion was a problem for state and local governments and offered
them federal advice, research results, and, if requested, investiga-
tions.14 Legislation in 196315 enriched the federal research effort,
offered the states the inducement of federal grants, and authorized
federal action against pollution sources, but only in narrowly de-
fined circumstances and after the completion of "bizarre" confer-
ence procedures. 16 Legislation enacted in 1965 directed federal
officials to regulate emissions from new vehicles after considering
feasibility and other factors. 17 Congress attempted a comprehen-
12. 116 CONG. REC. 42,381-82 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
13. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Senate Report].
14. The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322,
authorized the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to conduct re-
search on air pollution and to provide states with financial and technical assistance
for such research.
15. The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), established addi-
tional research and technical assistance programs and allowed HEW to spur states to
abate specific pollution problems endangering health or welfare.
16. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 210 (1977).
17. Automotive emissions first received federal attention in Pub. L. No. 86-493,
74 Stat. 162 (1960), which required the Surgeon General to study such emissions and
report the findings to Congress. Subsequently, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), required HEW to promulgate federal
standards controlling the emission of pollutants from new motor vehicles, taking into
account technological feasibility and economic costs.
[Vol. 30:740
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sive approach in the 1967 Act, which directed each state to adopt
air quality goals (state ambient air standards) consistent with fed-
eral assessments of the effects of various pollutants and then to
adopt a plan to achieve the state air quality goals.' 8 A federal
agency would take action if the state failed to do so, but this was
"hardly a credible, regulatory scheme."' 9 By 1970, some state and
local governments had instituted tough controls, 20 but federal offi-
cials had not acted aggressively. 21 Only one federal enforcement
action had reached court.
22
The statutes prior to 1970 gave the states and federal officials
wide discretion to balance environmental and other goals. That
legislation drew mounting criticism in the 1960s. Some legal
scholars argued that broad delegations made it hard for agencies
to tackle controversial issues.23 Others saw vague mandates as a
device to lull citizen concern while the regulated captured the reg-
ulators. 24 Many Americans felt governmental processes involving
broad discretion were unable to cope with an environmental
emergency of potentially lethal dimension, 25 an attitude that fit
the distrust generated by the Vietnam War, urban riots, and other
crises. 26
18. The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (amending the
Clean Air Act), sought to establish a systematic federal approach. It required HEW
to designate air quality criteria describing the effects of pollutants. Based on these
criteria, the states were to develop state ambient air standards and adopt plans for
their implementation in each region. HEW was authorized to fulfill non-complying
states' duties, but the procedures were cumbersome and time-consuming. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5356, 5360.
19. W. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 211.
20. See, e.g., J. KRIER & E. URSIN, POLLUTION & POLICY 184-89 (1977). Cf. D.
Costle, EPA Administrator, Remarks at the Meeting of the Air Pollution Control
Association in Montreal, Canada 2 (June 23, 1980) (transcript on file at UCLA Law
Review). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
A DIGEST OF STATE AIR POLLUTION LAWS (1967).
21. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 36; H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5356, 5360; 116 CONG. REC.
42,381-82 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie); Note, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970."
BetterAutomotive Ideasfrom Congress, 12 B.C.L. REV. 571, 578 (1971). For example,
federal regulation of new vehicles before 1970 had required reductions in emissions
but had not pushed manufacturers as far as then-existing technology allowed. Currie,
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution. State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 1083, 1086 (1970).
22. W. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 214.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
24. See infra note 27.
25. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1474-79.
26. [Tjhe crisis in confidence which afflicts too many Americans [is]
marked by self-doubt, by a fear that our problems may be greater than
our capacity to solve them, that our public and private institutions may
be inadequate at a time when we need them most.
116 CONG. REC. 32,900 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
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Senator Edmund Muskie, who sought to be the champion of
a new and electorally powerful environmental movement, 27 de-
clared that his 1970 Act guaranteed the achievement of clean air
goals by directing officials to take specified actions by specified
deadlines28 (action-forcing procedures) 29 The 1970 Act, accord-
ing to Muskie, its chief author, "intends that all Americans in all
parts of the country shall have clean air to breathe within the
1970's. ' ' 30 Dirty air would be made healthy by a date certain, and
places with pristine air would not be allowed to deteriorate.
3'
These promises were framed as literal commitments rather than
objectives of the legislation.3 2 The Act, in Senator Muskie's
words, "faces the air pollution crisis with urgency and in candor.
It makes hard choices . . .,,3
The action-forcing statute seemed to avoid compromise by
stating an absolute duty to achieve a set of goals-the protection
of health, welfare, and natural air quality. But Congress did not
decide what the Act's mandatory environmental goals meant and
how the burden of achieving them would be allocated. The Act
did not control what makes air dirty except for emissions from
new cars. 34 Instead, the action-forcing procedures in the statute
27. Muskie was accused in a Ralph Nader study of selling out on clean air in
"preoccupation with the 1972 [Presidential] election." J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR
287 (1970). Nader wrote of the air issue in terms of "liberation," "chemical ... war-
fare," "the corporate powers that turn nature against man," and the collapse of the
federal program "starting with Senator Edmund Muskie." Nader, Foreword to J. Es-
POSITO, supra, at vii-ix.
Muskie's opening statement introducing his bill on the Senate floor later in 1970
co-opted almost all but the last mentioned of Nader's charges. Compare id with 116
CONG. REC. 32,900-01 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) on (i) loss of faith in govern-
ment; (ii) non-enforcement of existing pollution laws; (iii) pollution not price of pro-
gress; (iv) maximum use of technology regardless of profit; and (v) man's violence to
nature. Muskie seems to parallel Nader, who wrote:
The deep loss of popular belief that government is capable of protecting
and advancing the public interest against this airborne epidemic and its
corporate sources reflects a broader absence of confidence.
Nader, supra, at vii.
28. 116 CONG. REC. 32,902 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
29. The term "action-forcing" has commonly been used to describe the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). See, e.g., United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669, 707 n.3 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Sen. Jackson); L. CALDWELL,
ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY 219 (1970). Ackerman & Hass-
ler, supra note 9, at 1470, describes the Clean Air Act as "agency forcing." "Action-
forcing" describes the Clean Air Act even more aptly than it does NEPA. Moreover,
the Act's procedures and deadlines apply to states as well as EPA. For these reasons,
I call the Act "action-forcing."
30. 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
3 1. See infra §§ I(A), (D).
32. 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
33. Id.
34. 1970 Act § 202 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. IV 1980)).
746
19831 CLEAN AIR ACT
sought to make a newly created EPA35 and the states decide how
to regulate conduct so as to fulfill the promises on schedule. 36
There was a sense about the "environment" in 1970, as with
the current concern about nuclear war, that something had to be
done, but there was little consensus as to the substance of reform.
The Act skirted disputes of substance and erected an elaborate
procedure that served the emotional needs of the public and the
political needs of public officials. 37 Government had made the
protection of natural air quality an objective in itself.38 It pur-
ported to outlaw death from air pollution.39 The 1970 legislation
was enacted by overwhelming votes in both the Senate and
House4° and was joyfully embraced by President Nixon 4' as well
as its sponsors.
35. EPA was established by President Nixon in Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35
Fed. Reg. 15,623, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app. (1976) andin 84 Stat. 2086 (effec-
tive Dec. 2, 1970).
36. See infra § II(A).
37. See infra §§ II(D), V(A), (C). As Senator Muskie said to his colleagues on
the floor:
The legislation we take up today provides the Senate with a mo-
ment of truth ....
This legislation will be a test of our commitment and a test of our
faith ....
116 CONG. REC. 32,900 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). Muskie quoted President
Nixon for the proposition that
Man . . . has been too cavalier in his relations with nature. Unless we
arrest the deprivations that have been inflicted so carelessly on natural
systems . . . we face the prospect of ecological disaster.
Id. at 32,901.
38. See infra § II(D).
39. Louis Jaffe opened an article written in the early 1970s about statutory re-
sponses to environmental concerns with a warning that:
The air is filled with prophecies of doom. . . . We must take stock and
steady our nerves. We must perhaps learn to accept that we, our soci-
ety, and even our world are mortal.
Jaffe, Ecological Goals and Ways and Means ofAchieving Them, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 1
(1972).
We are smart enough to know that individuals cannot avoid death, but not smart
enough to stop trying. Lewis Thomas wrote:
We like to think, hiding the thought, that with all the marvelous ways
in which we seem to lead nature around by the nose, perhaps we can
avoid the central problem if we just become, next year, say, a bit
smarter.
L. THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 55-56 (1974).
40. The Senate version of the act passed unopposed, 116 CONG. REC. 33,120
(1970) (for: 73, against: 0); the House version provoked a lone dissenting vote, id. at
19,244 (for: 375, against: 1). The conference report was agreed to by both the Senate
and House without opposition. Id. at 42,395 (Senate), 42,524 (House).
41. President's Remarks Upon Signing the Bill Into Law (Dec. 31, 1970), re-
printedin SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS of 1970, at 105 (Comm. Print 1974).
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B. The Act's Failure
The 1970 Act seemed to allow the setting of ambitious goals
because, if Congress itself had to choose specific pollution con-
trols, the costs of achieving the goals would come to the fore.
Whether or not such a stratagem was necessary or proper, it
backfired. The Act defused the pressure on Congress but was
technically, legally, and politically too imprecise to overcome the
counterpressure that later arose against the imposition of controls.
Decisions about the issues of substance, as will be shown,4 2 were
transferred from congressional debate to fora that were often less
capable of environmental protection.
The Act conferred on everyone an absolute right to healthy
air in the 1970s, but it gave the corresponding duty only to EPA,
which had just been born with legal duties far in excess of its
political power and administrative resources. 43 Once EPA's con-
genitally pierced veil is passed, the citizen with an absolute right
to breathe clean air can hold no one on earth to account in law.
The Clean Air Act was incantation.44 EPA does not currently rec-
ognize many harmful pollutants and tempers health standards for
recognized pollutants.45 The health standards that have been
promulgated are nonetheless violated in areas which "tend to be
large population centers." 46
Whether the Act's goals were achieved is, however, the wrong
question. The failure to achieve the stated goals was inevitable.
Human activity must produce emissions, and any conceivable
level of emissions creates risk.47 Also inevitable was progress to-
42. See infra § Ill(B). See also infra text accompanying note 425.
43. See infra §§ II(B)-(C).
44. An attribute of law, according to Pospisil, is that rights are connected to du-
ties and duties to rights. If, for instance, one has a right and no one has a duty to
satisfy it, the only recourse is to heaven, which is in Pospisil's words, "religious ta-
boo," not law. L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 81-87 (1971).
The legislature avoided the "hard choices" about what makes the air dirty by
playing back the public's guilt. The statute's meaning, according to Senator Muskie,
depends upon the "willingness of the people to make tough decisions." 116 CONG.
REC. 32,901 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). Every politician could be on the side of
goodness. One member of Congress, William Fitz Ryan, did object that the 1970
House bill, like its unanimously passed 1967 predecessor, would not be effective be-
cause it was "too noncontroversial." Id. at 19,202. No one replied.
45. See infra § II(C)(5)-(6).
46. D. Costle, supra note 20, at 2.
47. Placing supreme priority on the Act's goals of protecting health, welfare, and
natural air quality, over and above other social concerns, made no sense if taken
literally. Health and the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality are
themselves relative concepts. Moreover, in addition to absolute priority on air quali-
ty-a warlike attack on pollution as the 1970 Senate Report conceived it, supra note
13, at I--our government had previously declared a "War on Poverty" and would
soon declare the "moral equivalent of war" on energy problems. Absolute priorities
were being placed on these and other problems, usually without deciding which was
[Vol. 30:740
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wards controlling pollution since the public's demand for regula-
tion at the federal, state, and local level was already beginning to
show results. The failure was in the obstacles that the 1970 legis-
lation put in the way of progress. The Act undercut the law's abil-
ity to encourage better control technology, created uncertainties
for industries and inequities between firms, and produced an ad-
ministrative regime that was impossible to implement and en-
force. According to then EPA Administrator Douglas Costle "the
system is so cumbersome and problematical that it almost literally
forces us to focus on the trees instead of the forest. ' 48 Firms often
found it cheaper to hire lawyers and computer technicians to show
compliance on paper than to reduce emissions. 49 The Act also, by
forestalling resolution in Congress, has strained other institutions
of government, including the courts.50
This Article will argue that the very structure of the 1970 leg-
islation made these problems all but inevitable. There have been
charges from the Act's inception that the Administration (whether
under Nixon, Ford, or Carter) has implemented the Act with too
little or too much zeal.5 ' Even the Reagan Administration, for
example, has had to to take note of the public's environmental
concerns.5 2 Some of EPA's harshest critics acknowledge that the
agency has attracted unusually able employees. 53 The fundamen-
tal problem with the Act is not in EPA's administration, at least
until 1981, or in any particular detail or technicality of the statute.
Some criticize the Act for mandating the achievement of en-
vironmental objectives regardless of other circumstances. 54 There
really absolute. So to fault the Clean Air Act for its failure to achieve its literally
stated goals is to fall prey to a mystification, no less than to conclude that emissions
have been controlled too much on the basis of the Act's seemingly absolute commit-
ment to protect health regardless of feasibility.
48. D. Costle, supra note 20, at 9-10.
49. Id. at 10.
50. See infra § IV(C).
51. See J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA 90, 200-01 (1976).
52. EPA had proposed to weaken its regulation of lead in gasoline as part of the
Reagan Administration's program to reduce the cost of regulation, but then strength-
ened the regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322 (Oct. 29, 1982), in response to a public out-
cry. N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1982, at AI, col. 5. See also The Hard Politics of Lead
(editorial), N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1982, at A18, col. 1.
53. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1469 ("Yet the people who shaped the
1979 decision are remarkable for their high intelligence and conscientiousness. Their
failure to make sensible policy is a symptom of organizational, not personal, break-
down-a failure to give decisionmakers bureaucratic incentives to ask the hard ques-
tions raised by any serious effort to control the environment.").
54. Eg., J. KRIER & E. URSIN, supra note 20, at 321-45; L. LAVE & G. OMENN,
CLEARING THE AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 45-46 (1981); Currie, Relaxa-
tion of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 155, 158 (1979); Currie, FederalAir Quality Standards and Their Implementation,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 365, 408. See also Alexander, A Simpler Path to a
19831
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is merit in this charge, but it alone is not a sufficient diagnosis of
the Act's failure. The Act's sponsors knew that absolute health
protection was a concept without substance.5 5 Moreover, the Act
gave abundant opportunities, which have been used, to balance
silently the risks of emissions with the costs of their control. Even
major industries and the Reagan Administration now argue for
maintaining the 1970 Act's goal of protecting health regardless of
cost; the key for them is flexibility in deciding when and how to
impose controls to achieve the mandatory goals.
56
Another prominent criticism of the Act is that its procedures
are too cumbersome. 57 This charge also has merit. But what is
the remedy? The procedures that are attacked as hobbling deci-
sion under the Act were put there to cure the inaction that seemed
to have resulted from more flexible statutory designs.
58
The criticisms of the Act as having goals that are too absolute
or procedures that are too cumbersome tend to emphasize the dif-
ference between action-forcing statutes and broad delegation stat-
utes.59 They do not tell the whole story of the Act's inability to
Cleaner Environment, FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 234; Ideology and Clean Air, N.Y.
Times, March 15, 1982, at A16, col. I (editorial); MacAvoy, The EP.A. Could Be
Expendable, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1980, at F2, col. 3.
The sources in this and the following note contain a far richer lode of insights
than the stark propositions for which they are cited. My purpose is to highlight the
difference between my framework for analysis and that of previous work. Henderson
& Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies- The Limits of Aspirational
Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978), is closest to my work in its view of the
process, but is still quite dissimilar in its analytic framework. Henderson and Pear-
son, as I, are concerned with the problems that arise when the law is used to try to
realize hopes without adequate regard to the process of implementation. While my
analytic tool is the distinction that I will draw between goals statutes and rules stat-
utes, their focus for analysis is "aspirational commands," by which they mean orders
that are vague as to what must be done and instead ask the addressee to try to reach
some objective. Id. at 1429-30. Their aspirational commands would not include, as
far as they present their analysis, goals statutes in the broad delegation mold, For
them, the New Source Performance Standards provision of the Clean Air Act is not
an aspirational command. Id. at 1444 n.59. But, aspirational commands could in-
clude "rules," id. at 1430, addressed to polluters. Those who make the commands
could include judges and agencies, not just the legislature whose work my analysis
turns upon. Id. at 1543-56, 1564.
55. See infra note 139.
56. E.g., Retain Air Act Deadlines, Drop Sanctions, Industry Representatives Rec-
ommend, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 747, 747-48 (Oct. 16, 1981); N.Y. Times, Aug. 7,
1981, at A12; U.S. Steel Takes a Stand on Clean Air, FORBES 144 (July 5, 1982) (ad-
vertisement). For a useful critique of the Reagan Administration's use of cost/benefit
concepts, see Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 409, 416-20 (1982) (advertisement).
57. E.g., Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, supra
note 54, at 409-09; Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1059 (1981).
58. See supra note 27.
59. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1470. See also supra note 54.
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translate its goals into enforced controls. This Article offers a di-
agnosis that emphasizes the Act's similarity in structure to broad
delegation statutes and perceives its absolutism and complication
as symptoms of this structure. The claim that the Act differs from
broad delegation statutes in having made hard choices, which
some commentators have credited,60 is undeserved. Because, as
this Article demonstrates, cumbersome procedures and absolutist
goals can still beg the question of what will be done in substance.
Commentators from a broad range of perspectives are content to
maintain the basic structure in which Congress specifies clean air
goals and delegates power to promulgate controls to reach those
goals; they would, however, add elements of flexibility-the hall-
mark of the broad delegation model.6' This Article argues that
Congress itself should promulgate the controls.
C. A voiding Decision Through Goals Statutes
Some statutes, to be called "goals statutes," announce goals
and authorize delegates to promulgate controls on conduct in fur-
therance of those goals.62 "Rules statutes," on the other hand,
state rules of conduct. Pre-1970 air pollution legislation, as well as
the 1970 Act (except to the extent that it limited emissions from
new cars), were goals statutes because Congress left the choice of
permissible conduct to others. Both the action-forcing and the
broad delegation varieties of goals statutes confer the power to
make policy by allocating duties and rights rather than stating
standards of conduct in the statutes. Both seek to overcome a per-
60. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 413 (1981); Stewart, The Reform ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1696 n.130 (1975). While the 1977 Amendments in particular have been
criticized for sloppy and question-begging drafting, see sources cited infra note 421,
this Article argues that the Act's ambiguity is endemic to its goals structure.
61. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY, To BREATHE CLEAN
AIR 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION]: "The Commission's rec-
ommendations reflect a general conclusion that the structure of the Clean Air Act is
sound and needs refinement instead of fundamental changes."; id. at 326 (dissenting
statement of Commissioners Ayres, Crocetti, and Sheehan concluding that the Com-
mission should have recommended "more modest alternatives"); D. CURRIE, supra
note 1, § 33 (the "basic principle.., is a good one" but is encumbered); Ackerman &
Hassler, supra note 9 at 1566-71; Pederson, supra note 57, at 1063, 1093-109. See also
sources cited supra note 56.
62. There is a long tradition of awarding franchises under goals statutes. See,
e.g., The Interstate Commerce Act (pt. I), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1976); and the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958,49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976). An extreme example as applied
to the private economy is the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, § 3,
c. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196, which was struck down in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Recent examples of goals statutes are the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976), and the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) (establishing the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission).
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ceived inability of government to keep the regulatory focus on
public rather than special interests: the broad delegation model
by conferring wide power on experts, 63 and the action-forcing
model by imposing on government the duty to achieve mandatory
goals.
In a well known article written shortly after the passage of the
1970 clean air legislation, Louis Jaffe argues that "broad delega-
tion" rather than tight control of the agency as to "ends and
means" is no way to escape political forces.64 For him, broad del-
egation transfers the political disputes from the legislature to
lower visibility fora65 where there is an "indisposition of the
agency to decide controversial questions. '66  While rejecting
broad delegations as "panacea," Jaffe concludes that delegation
does hold "some potential for creative administrative action.
'67
The "reformer"
is most likely to succeed if he secures a specific and firm polit-
ical judgment from Congress which will resolve, to the degree
appropriate formulae permit, the sharp conflicts of interest
which are likely to be incapable of resolution by an agency
... . The statutory language may be more or less general in
terms; what counts is the statutory history. The key to success
is the strong and persistent public opinion which demands a
response to a given problem, which is sufficiently organized to
press for the detailed legislative solution required, and which
will, ultimately, keep the administration on the job of imple-
menting it.68
Thus, Jaffe seeks to define a more workable form of goals statute
than the broad delegation model.
Jaffe mentions the 1970 Act as a possible application of his
prescription for success. 69 The sponsors of the 1970 Act expressed
views similar to Jaffe's. Prior legislation had not done the job be-
cause it was subject to continuing erosion in the implementation
process. 70 Congress had to make the "hard choices." 7' The key to
success lay in the public opinion that gave rise to the legislation,
63. See, e.g., Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1470. Ackerman and Hassler
initially portray the mandatory goals and "New Source Performance Standards" of
the 1970 Act as departures from the New Deal model, while they see the state imple-
mentation plan process as a continuation of the prior approach. Id. at 1476-78. Yet
they acknowledge the elasticity in the New Source Performance Standards, id. at
1478, and later note the elasticity in the seemingly mandatory goals, id. at 1568.
64. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183,
1188-90 (1973).
65. Id. at 1185, 1190.
66. Id. at 1194.
67. Id. at 1196, 1197.
68. Id. at 1198.
69. Id.
70. Eg., 116 CONG. REC. 32,901 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
71. Id. at 42,381.
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sentiment that must continue for the Act to succeed.72 The Act
sought to "generate a sense of urgency" and then harness that ur-
gency through the citizen suit provision and public hearing
requirements.
73
There could have been no more fervent application of Jaffe's
prescription. The key controversy in 1970 centered on the priority
between health and other concerns. It is hard to see how the legis-
lative language could have more clearly defined health's priority
in Jaffe's terms.74 The legislative history, which Jaffe sees as more
important than the statutory language, seems to state precisely the
requirement to protect health and the kinds of activities that might
have to be abandoned to do so.75 Furthermore, recent opinion
polls and the activity of environmental groups show a high degree
of continuing public support for the legislation's
implementation.
76
The Act's abstract level nonetheless left untouched issues
which would have necessarily been resolved in generating con-
crete rules of conduct. First, Congress provided no guidance as to
how the costs of achieving the statutory goal should be allocated.
Thus, the difficult job of imposing costs to realize the benefit is
given to a body with less power than Congress. Under a goals
statute, the statutory delegate, such as EPA, is caught between
those who inevitably will resist the imposition of costly regulatory
burdens and a statutory mandate. Second, when EPA or some
other delegate looks for justification in its mandate to achieve the
legislated goal, it usually finds that the statute provides insufficient
guidance as to the meaning of the goal. Because the legislation
was written on the relatively abstract level of social priorities
rather than conduct, it is likely to be either spuriously absolute
(e.g., protect health regardless of cost), or vacuous (e.g., balance
health and cost).
Goals statutes, even those with the supposedly specific action-
forcing procedures of the 1970 Act, thus speak in abstractions that
generate contention among experts and mask the disparate expec-
tations of lay persons. The problem with the goals statutes that
broadly delegate decision-making authority is that they leave key
value choices to low visibility decisionmakers fearful of making
72. Id. at 32,901.
73. Id See also 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 3, 12.
74. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 3.
75. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 1-3, 9-11.
76. Public Would Support Changes to Act Only fAir Does Not Suffer, Poll Finds,
12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 973 (Dec. 11, 1981); Harris Survey Finds 80 Percent of Public in
Opposition to Relaxing Air Regulations, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 789 (Oct. 23, 1981);
Americans Do Not Want to Weaken Air, Harris Survey Finds, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
280, 280-81 (June 26, 1981).
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controversial choices. This is all the more true of the 1970 Act,
which makes decisions invisible by overlooking the need to make
them. In a goals statute, the legislature does half of a job: it
promises benefits without allocating costs, and it broadcasts rights
without assigning duties. The unrealistic goals of the 1970 Act are
not the fundamental cause of its difficulties but the result of a stat-
utory structure-the goals structure-that facilitates wishful
thinking in public opinion and legislation. The Clean Air Act's
incantation of goals and procedures concealed a refusal to make
choices about the present.
77
Goals statutes are especially proper, it is said, for complex
industrial problems because entities other than Congress can mold
the controls to fit the varied and changing circumstances of the
modem world.78 This view would seem to apply with special
weight to the regulation of air pollution, a technical and complex
problem. This Article questions this view by attempting to show
that rules statutes provide a better legal model for dealing with air
pollution than goals statutes.
A rules statute approach to air pollution could, for example,
limit the emissions from cars per mile traveled, limit the emissions
from power plants per BTU of energy produced, or tax the quanti-
ty of emissions from particular sources. Goals statutes, in con-
trast, leave selection of the controls on conduct to those who apply
the statute. Some examples are authorizing an agency to limit
emissions on the basis of the "public interest," the "protection of
public health," or "an efficient consideration of health, welfare,
and the costs of control"; these terms do not state whose conduct
must be curbed or in what way.
The distinction between rules and goals statutes is not easily
made, and it will receive more analytical treatment later in this
Article. By now, it should be plain that a goals statute may have a
goal that is tightly or loosely defined. At the same time, a rules
statute may have a rule that is seemingly iron-clad or requires in-
terpretation. Even a rules statute that leaves room for interpreta-
tion requires the legislature to make its intentions about the
treatment of most situations reasonably clear, while goals statutes
allow the legislature to stay on an abstract plane where there may
be no formal statement as to the disposition of any situation. En-
actment of a rules statute does not mean that the statute may not
have goals but rather provides a means for the legislature to pur-
77. Giving a new purpose to the Clean Air Act, such as by replacing "health" by
a less absolute goal such as "efficiency," would exchange the totems of the last decade
for ones of newer fashion without necessarily making the statute more workable.
78. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6-7 (1976).
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sue a mix of goals without conferring too broad a power on ad-
ministrative agencies.
A rules statute approach to air pollution, based on compro-
mise and aimed at the biggest health risks, would not deal with all
the hazards. It would, however, have a better chance than any
goals statute of being enforced and of resolving the uncertainty
and delay that have too long hindered economic change, health
protection, and the development of better technology for pollution
control. Most emissions of major pollutants come from power
plants, other large fuel burners, and motor vehicles. Congress
ought to be able to prescribe rules for at least these sources.
The enactment of rules statutes to combat air pollution need
not deprive regulation of expertise. Congress could look to EPA
to propose and enforce rules, as well as to interpret them. In this
sense, the approach advocated here for air pollution is not a fun-
damental challenge to the use of administrative agencies. As to
fields other than air pollution, investigation by experts in the vari-
ous areas may show, I suspect, 79 that much of what agencies do
under the heading of delegation is the interpretation of somewhat
vague rules statutes.
The Clean Air Act is an interesting and important lens
through which to compare rules statutes and goals statutes. The
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were the first application of a
new genre of regulatory reform that influenced subsequent stat-
utes in environmental80 and other areas.8' The provisions al-
lowing individuals to sue officials who fail to carry out mandatory
duties also served as the model for the "citizen suit" provision
now found in many modern statutes.8 2
Part II discusses the problems with implementing the goals of
the Clean Air Act through controls on conduct upon which Con-
79. See infra text accompanying notes 282-284.
80. Eg., the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 12, 15, 31
and 33 of U.S.C.); the Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 and 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
81. The indicia of this genre of statute are plans, mandatory goals, and deadlines.
See, e.g., Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) (state plans, § 1413); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (state plans, § 6063); and
United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8795
(Supp. IV 1980) (specifying a goal of the equivalent of 500,000 barrels per day (bpd)
by 1987 and 2,000,000 bpd by 1992, § 8721).
82. See, e.g., the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1976); the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980); and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (Supp. IV 1980).
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gress had not decided. Part III suggests that other goals ap-
proaches to air pollution would most likely lead to similar
problems. Part IV proposes a rules statute alternative, and Part V
puts the choice between a rules statute and goals statute approach
for clean air into a broader perspective.
II. THE STORY OF THE ACT
A. hat the 1970 Congress Decided
1. The public shall be protected from every harm
The 1970 Act purported to protect public health and welfare
from every harmful pollutant so that "there should be no gaps in
control activities." 83 The 1970 Act conceives of three categories of
harmful air pollutants in descending order of importance:
-Ambient pollutants are those that come from numerous
sources. 84 Sulfur oxides, for instance, are emitted from coal and
oil-burning facilities and many others.
-Hazardous pollutants are those that do not come from nu-
merous sources, and therefore do not fall into the preceding cate-
gory, but are specially hazardous. 85 Vinyl chloride, for example,
is emitted by relatively few plants and is believed to be a cause of
cancer.
86
-- Other harmfulpollutants are those that neither come from
numerous sources nor are especially hazardous and therefore do
not fit into the preceding two categories.87 Flourides, for example,
come primarily from certain aluminum and fertilizer plants and
do not critically harm human health, according to EPA. 88 There
is a separate process for each category, with the most embracing
planning directed against the ambient pollutants.
a. The process for ambient pollutants. The EPA Administra-
tor must list each harmful pollutant found to be emitted by nu-
merous sources.8 9 Within fifteen months of listing, the
Administrator must promulgate national ambient air quality stan-
83. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 20. See also Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976); 1970 Senate Report, supra note
13, at 18-19.
84. 1970 Act § 108(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
85. Id. § 112(a) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)).
86. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 56,560 (1976) (regulations codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.60
(1982)).
87. 1970 Act § I II(d)(I) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
88. 39 Fed. Reg. 37,602 (1974).
89. 1970 Act § 108(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (Supp. IV




dards for the pollutant. 90 An ambient standard governs the con-
centration of a pollutant in the air that the public breathes as
distinguished from an emission standard, which governs the rate
at which a pollutant flows into the air from a smoke stack or
tailpipe. 91 Under the 1970 Act, the ambient air standards estab-
lish mandatory goals for emission limits for the controls on con-
duct to achieve.92 The ambient standards are to be national, i.e.,
achieved throughout the country, unlike the state ambient stan-
dards under prior law. National uniformity was supposed to pre-
vent interstate competition for jobs from undercutting the
pollution control program.
93
The Administrator must set a primary ambient standard at a
level below which he judges the pollutant must be kept to safe-
guard human health94 and a secondary ambient standard to pro-
tect welfare which is broadly defined to include, for example,
impacts on crops, man-made materials, wildlife, soil, and visibil-
ity, as well as effects on people involving comfort rather than
health.95
Within nine months after promulgation of the ambient air
quality standards for a pollutant, "each state shall. . . adopt and
submit to the Administrator" plans to implement, maintain, and
enforce the ambient standards everywhere in the state.96 Within
another four months, the Administrator must approve or disap-
prove the state implementation plans; he shall approve a plan if,
but only if, it meets requirements that the state identify emission
controls, enforcement, monitoring, and other activity to ensure
compliance with the ambient standards.
97
The Act distinguishes existing sources from new sources, and
stationary sources (such as factories) from mobile sources (such as
cars or trucks). The Act requires federal emission controls on new
stationary and mobile sources. The Administrator must establish
a list of categories of stationary sources, such as power plants, that
"may contribute significantly" to harmful air pollution and then,
for each, must promulgate New Source Performance Standards
90. Fifteen months is the sum time available for performing the duties prescribed
in the 1970 Act. Id. §§ 108(a), 109(a)(l)(b), (a)(2) (corresponding current versions at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a)(2), 7409(a)(1)(b), (a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
91. 1970 Act § 302(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(1) (Supp. IV 1980)).
92. See infra note 264.
93. See infra note 387.
94. 1970 Act § 109(b)(l) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
95. Id. §§ 109(b)(2), 302(h) (corresponding current versions at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7409(b)(2), 7602(h) (Supp. IV 1980)).
96. Id. § 110(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)).
97. Id. § 110(a)(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
See also Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65-67 (1975).
19831
UCLA4 L4W REVIEW
that put a ceiling on emissions from new sources that is as low as
possible, consistent with economic and technological feasibility.
98
The Administrator must also prescribe emissions standards for
any harmful pollutant from any class of new motor vehicles, again
taking account of feasibility. 99 While this command applies to all
harmful pollutants from all classes of new motor vehicles, Con-
gress required a 90% emission reduction for automobiles to be
achieved for two specified pollutants in the 1975 model year'00
and another pollutant in the 1976 model year. 101
A state may rely on the federal emissions controls on new
sources, but states are responsible for making up the difference
between what the federal emission controls achieve and what the
federal ambient air standards require.0 2 So long as the ambient
standards are met, the state may limit the emissions from a given
source a little, a lot, or not at all.'0 3 Put another way, Congress
left the states with sole responsibility for the tough problem of
placing controls on existing sources-the factories that were al-
ready built and employing people and the cars and trucks that
were already sold and being driven by voters.
b. The process for hazardous pollutants. Hazardous pollu-
tants do not, by definition, come from numerous sources. So the
regulatory process for them does without the planning tools of
ambient standards and without state plans that take account of
exposure to emissions from multiple sources.'°4 The Administra-
tor must publish a list of hazardous air pollutants. 0 5 Within 360
days after listing, the Administrator must establish standards for
emissions of the pollutant from new or existing sources to protect
health. 10
6
c. The process for other harmful pollutants. The regulatory
process for other harmful pollutants is the least exacting. The Act
98. 1970 Act § 11l(a)-(b) (corresponding current versions at 42 U.S.C.
§ 741 1(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1980)).
99. Id. § 202(a)(1), (2) (corresponding current versions at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1),
(2) (Supp. IV 1980)). The Administrator may regulate fuels and their refiners, instead
of new vehicles and their manufacturers, to curb harmful pollutants as well as to
ensure that fuels do not damage emissions control equipment. Id. § 211 (c)(1) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)).
100. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. IV 1980))
(carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons).
101. Id. § 202(b)(1)(3) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. IV 1980))
(oxides of nitrogen).
102. Eg., 40 C.F.R. § 51.14(a) (1981).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 126-128.
104. Cf. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 18.
105. 1970 Act § 112(b)(1)(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (Supp.
IV 1980)).




does not require that the Administrator maintain a list of such
pollutants. Rather, these pollutants come to light through the pro-
cedures for the promulgation of New Source Performance Stan-
dards.'0 7  If the Administrator establishes a New Source
Performance Standard applicable to a pollutant not listed with
either the ambient or hazardous pollutants, the Administrator
must prescribe regulations to establish a procedure "similar" to
that for state implementation plans for ambient pollutants.
0 8
Each state must then adopt a plan to impose emissions standards
on existing sources of that pollutant.109
2. Neither economic nor technological feasibility should
compromise the protection of public health and welfare
in the long run
The Act seemed to deal with economic and technological fea-
sibility without compromising its vow to protect public health and
welfare. The Act requires the EPA Administrator to consider eco-
nomic and technological feasibility in establishing standards for
new stationary sources" 10 and new motor vehicles."' But feasibil-
ity may not be considered in establishing the ambient air stan-
dards and other health and welfare goals"12 or in deciding
whether these goals shall be met."13 Feasibility is, however, al-
lowed to affect when the goals are met. The Act thus tries to use
time to avoid either compromising its ideals or ignoring
feasibility.
A state plan must meet the primary (health) standard "as ex-
peditiously as practicable but. . . in no case later than three years
from the date of approval."'" 4 Both economic and technological
feasibility may justify this three-year delay in protecting health;
thereafter, "availability of technology," but not cost, may be taken
into account and then only for a limited time." 5 Putting the Act's
107. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 18.
108. 1970 Act § I l(d)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (d)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 11 (a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1980)).
111. In the instance of new vehicles, Congress takes account of feasibility through
the timing of the emission reductions, which take effect "after such period as the ad-
ministrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such
period." Id. § 202(a)(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
112. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
113. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64-67
(1975).
114. 1970 Act § I 10(f) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV
1980)).
115. When submitting the state plan, a governor may seek a two-year extension in
the attainment date if, in the interim, necessary technology will not be available and
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deadlines end to end meant that the primary ambient air stan-
dards would be achieved in the 1970s, as promised.
The time schedule for hazardous pollutants is similar in con-
cept, though accelerated because of the particular danger of these
pollutants."l 6 The Act is least precise regarding a deadline for
protecting health from "other harmful pollutants."
' 17
"Welfare" receives lower priority than "health." State plans
for harmful and widespread pollutants must achieve the secon-
dary ambient standards in a "reasonable time" to be specified in
the plan by the state." l8 The Act thus allows both economic and
technological feasibility to be taken into account for an indefinite
time, but theoretically adheres to the principle that welfare will be
protected on a schedule.
Given the mandate to meet the primary standards by a date
certain, what is to happen if the time to meet health standard runs
out? The Act's sponsors said that "[s]ome facilities may be
closed"" 9 and that such threats would induce industry to develop
the technology needed to achieve the Act's goals. 20 This theory
has been called "technology-forcing."' 12
reasonable alternatives are used. Id § 110(e) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e)
(Supp. IV 1980)). After the plan is approved, a governor may secure a one-year delay
in the plan's compliance date for a particular pollution source if, inter alia, the re-
quired technology is not available despite the source's good faith efforts. Id. § 110(f)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f) (Supp. IV 1980)). The 1970 Act provided no
further extension. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60,
89-90 (1975); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 178-79 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
116. From the date of promulgation, new sources must comply with the standard;
existing sources must comply within ninety days except that the Administrator may
grant an extension of up to two years upon a finding that the technology is not yet
available and that health will be protected from imminent danger in the meantime.
1970 Act § 112(c)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)). In
addition, the President may except any source for up to one year on national security
grounds. Id § 112(c)(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980)).
117. The Act requires the Administrator to specify procedures that are "similar"
to those for the harmful and widespread pollutants. Id § 11 l(d)(1) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980)).
118. Id § 110(a)(2)(A)(ii) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp.
IV 1980)). The Administrator may, moreover, allow an extra 18 months for a state to
submit a plan to attain a secondary ambient standard. Id § 110(b) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7410(b) (Supp. IV 1980)).
119. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 2. See supra note 115.
120. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 2-3.
121. The term first appeared in cases and commentaries in 1975. Note, Forcing
Technology- The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713, 1713 n.3 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Forcing Technology]. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 421 U.S. 60. 91 (1975).
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3. Congress will not be responsible for imposing the infeasible
controls that the Act requires
"Technology-forcing" and, indeed, the Act's entire promise
of safe air in the 1970s depended on some governmental authority
actually imposing controls on sources of pollution sufficient to
protect health, regardless of economic or technological feasibility.
Congress had not imposed such controls itself. Congress took re-
sponsibility only for the 90% reduction in the emissions of three
pollutants from new cars. 122 Congress had not decided whether
compliance for new cars was feasible, but it hedged by directing
EPA to grant a one-year extension if the manufacturers tried hard
and still fell short of the standard 23 and by inviting manufactur-
ers to return to Congress if more time was needed.
24
It was primarily left to the states to make up the difference
between the congressionally-directed controls on new sources that
take economic and technical feasibility into account 25 and the ab-
solute congressional promise of clean air in the 1970s. The Act
allowed a state to regulate any source it chose, except federally
regulated mobile sources,126 so long as the state's plan as a whole
would achieve the federally mandated result. 27 According to
Senator Muskie:
State and local authorities would be able to pursue options
among a broad array, seeking a possible way of controlling or
preventing air pollution that is most responsive to the nature of
their air pollution problem and most responsive to their needs.
In my judgment, the bill would give the State and local authori-
122. 1970 Act § 202(b)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)). See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
123. See id § 202(b)(5) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(b)(5) (Supp. IV
1980)).
124. 116 CONG. REC. 32,904 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
125. The controls that the Act required EPA itself to impose on new stationary
sources and new vehicles provide for consideration of economic and technical feasi-
bility. EPA must protect health from hazardous air pollutants regardless of feasibil-
ity, but with the added justification that a special danger is coming from a limited
number of sources. Few "hazardous" pollutants were expected. 1970 Senate Report,
supra note 13, at 20.
126. State regulation of emissions from new vehicles was preempted, with limited
exception. 1970 Act § 209 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (Supp. IV 1980)).
Where the Administrator had regulated a fuel, or found such regulation not "neces-
sary," see supra note 99, state regulation was preempted except where "necessary" to
achieve an ambient air standard. Id. § 211(c)(4) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1980)).
127. See, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975); 40
C.F.R. § 51.2 (1981). The state could, for example, require new stationary sources to
emit less pollution than allowed by the federal New Source Performance Standards,
require existing factories, residences, trucks, or cars to be retrofitted with pollution
control equipment, restrict the movement of vehicles, manage its streets differently, or
spend more money on public transportation.
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ties sufficient latitude in selecting ways to prevent and control
air pollution.1
28
The Clean Air Act's comforting tidings of clean air without
undue burden went largely unquestioned, 29 perhaps because of
the abstract nature of the Act. Not surprisingly, the only control
on conduct specified in the Act-the required 90% reduction in
emissions from new cars-sparked the hottest debate."
30
After the Act was signed into law and EPA promulgated its
first ambient air standards at levels which the Act's sponsors ex-
pected, 3 1 the controls implicit in the Act began to take specific
shape for real places, people, and businesses."32 Measures needed
to achieve the ambient air standards within the statutory timetable
included cutting gasoline use in the Los Angeles area by over
80%7, 133 eliminating 30-40% of the parking in the business areas of
Manhattan," 4 and prohibiting the construction of new plants
whose emissions would cause or contribute to violations of the
ambient air standards, even if the new plants would meet the New
Source Performance Standards."35 Such harsh measures were
generally not enforced because the Act did not provide an effec-
tive response to the inevitable resistance to controls, as the follow-
ing section will show.
B. What the 1970 Congress Did Not Decide
1. What is health?
Congress gave EPA the responsibility for achieving the goals
of the Act, but gave no meaningful guidance as to what the goals
were. The primary ambient standard was "allowing an adequate
margin of safety . . . to protect the public health."1 36 The stan-
128. 116 CONG. REC. 42,386 (1970).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 130, 293.
130. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 33,073-96 (1970). Moreover, the only close votes
on the Act involved two proposed amendments regarding a one-year extension in the
deadline for reaching the 90% reduction. Id. at 33,088 (Sen. Gurney's amendment:
for: 22, against: 57); id. at 33,089 (Sen. Dole's amendment: for: 32, against: 43).
131. The 1970 Senate Report stated the following levels were necessary to protect
the health of persons: carbon monoxide, 8-10 parts per million (ppm); photochemical
oxidants, 0.06 ppm; nitrogen oxides, 0.10 ppm. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at
25. The standards later promulgated by EPA were: carbon monoxide, 9 ppm; photo-
chemical oxidants, 0.08 ppm; nitrogen dioxide, 0.05 ppm. 36 Fed. Reg. 8186, 8187
(1971).
132. The 1970 Senate Report mentions types of controls that would be required,
but without naming the places where they would apply. 1970 Senate Report, supra
note 3, at 2.
133. 38 Fed. Reg. 2194, 2195 (1973).
134. Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118, 1124 (2d Cir. 1974).
135. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 12-13.
136. 1970 Act § 109(b)(l) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
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dard for hazardous pollutants was to provide "an ample margin of
safety to protect the public health."' 137 There was no guidance as
to the meaning of "adequate" or "ample."' 138 In addition, EPA's
duty to "protect the public health" presumed that EPA could
demonstrate a threshold in pollution concentration that divides
healthy from risky. Congress, however, knew there was no thresh-
old level. 139 The concept of "welfare" that underlay the secon-
dary ambient standards was equally vacuous.
40
2. What happens if a state does not submit a plan?
By allowing the states to choose the specific form of the con-
trols, Congress got to bear the glad tidings of clean air and left
state officials to bear the bad tidings of regulatory impositions.
State officials could not be expected to cooperate for long in this
version of cooperative federalism. In 1972, when it still was dan-
gerous to appear "anti-environment," states generally did submit
plans as required by the Act.14' These plans were based on very
rough notions of the relationship between emissions and ambient
air quality; some plans reduced emissions more than necessary;
142
others cut corners. 43 By 1973, state and local officials began to
rebel openly against the Clean Air Act as some of its harsher im-
plications became apparent, and many states refused to submit
137. Id. § 112(b)(1)(B) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(l)(B) (Supp. IV
1980)).
138. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 3-4.
139. Reflecting back on the 1970 Act, Senator Muskie later stated:
Our public health scientists and doctors have told us that there is no
threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act is based
on the assumption, although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that
there is a threshold. When we set the standards, we understood that
below the standard that we set there would still be health effects. The
standard we picked was simply the best judgment we had on the basis
of the available evidence as to what the unacceptable health effects in
terms of the country as a whole would be.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environmental
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works (pt. 3), 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1977).
140. See supra text accompanying note 95.
141. "(A)ny tampering with the strict commands of the Clean Air Act would not
be tolerated in the politics of 1972." J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 91.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1013, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3281, 3299 (letter from Russell E. Train, EPA Administrator to
Carl T. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 22, 1974)).
143. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975)
(intermittent controls); Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975)
(intermittent emission limitation system); Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974) (granting of variances, allowing tall stacks, taking
into account economic impact and technological feasibility), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
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colorably adequate implementation plans.44
The authors of the Act, despite their political sophistication,
made no realistic provision to cope with the inevitable reaction of
state and local officials. Thus began the Act's unraveling.
The Act says that a state "shall adopt and submit" a plan to
EPA.145 As the Supreme Court put it, Congress was "taking a
stick to the States."' 46 But if a state did not submit a plan, the
Administrator was to promulgate a federal plan for the state.
147
So the Administrator, rather than the state, has the duty to adopt a
plan; the state has an option to act first rather than a duty. The
illusion that the state must submit plans obscured the fact that
Congress had delegated responsibility to a federal agency and had
done so in a way that made the agency's job all but impossible.
EPA would have to show that the controls on emissions in its
state plans were neither more nor less than needed to achieve the
ambient air standards. 148 Yet adequate models to translate emis-
sions into reliable predictions of ambient air quality did not, and
still do not, exist for most ambient pollutants. 49 For many states,
a statutorily sufficient plan would require painful choices about
the building of new plants, the operation of old plants, the use of
automobiles, the construction of new highways, the location of
new shopping centers, and more. A local manifestation of one of
these issues could be a celebrated cause. The Act, however, poten-
tially required a new federal agency to make decisions on many
issues in many locales of many states at once. The legislative de-
bates gave hardly a hint of any such federal initiative.
A legally adequate plan must not only design, but also must
implement and enforce controls. Was EPA to field a force to
check smoke stacks and tailpipes and take over land use control,
highway construction, and traffic management? Could EPA com-
mand the states to carry out such functions? The prevailing view
among the circuits, even before National League of Cities v.
144. Of the many states required to submit plans to control transportation, only
two submitted a plan that EPA could approve. Quarles, The Transportation Control
Plans--Federal Regulation's Collision With Reality, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241,
244-45 (1977); see also id. at 249-50; J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 195.
145. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
146. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975).
147. 1970 Act § 110(c) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (Supp. IV 1980)). A
federal requirement that states adopt and enforce implementation plans appeared to
be constitutionally questionable prior to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). See Dorsen, The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act." A Prob-
lem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 45, 57-58 (1974) (federal coercion of state en-
forcement constitutionally suspect).
148. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1086.
149. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 95.
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Usery, 50 was that, under the Act, EPA must implement on its
own what must be done in a federally promulgated plan.1 5' EPA
had neither the resources nor the mandate to do this job. 5 2
3. What sources of pollution shall bear the burden?
The illusion that states must submit plans also obscured Con-
gress' failure to provide guidance as to how EPA should allocate
the cost of meeting ambient air standards. An implementation
plan could, for example: (1) require equal percentage reductions
in emissions from all smoke stacks; (2) require reductions in emis-
sions in proportion to each source's contribution to ambient con-
centrations at the place the ambient standard is violated; (3)
require all sources of a particular type to meet the same emissions
limit per unit of output; or (4) adjust the clean-up burden so as to
minimize total cost, employment effects, or utility bills.
If the plan barely attains the standard, no margin will be left
for new facilities that would emit that pollutant, even if the new
sources meet the federal New Source Performance Standards.
Both property values and future employment will be affected by
how much of a margin, if any, is left for new sources and how it is
to be allocated.
Still further complications arise when mobile as well as sta-
tionary sources emit the pollutant. The Act's authors expected
that some states would have to control travel or limit new high-
ways, new housing, or other construction that might stimulate
travel. 153
Congress also failed to provide guidance on allocating costs
when sources in several states cause violations of ambient air stan-
dards. The Act purports to deal with interstate air pollution by
requiring state plans to contain "measures necessary to insure that
emissions of air pollutants from sources located in any air quality
control region will not interfere with the attainment or mainte-
nance of such primary or secondary standard in any portion of
such region outside of such State or in any other air quality con-
trol region."1 54 There is no hint as to whether "interfere with"
150. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
151. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated as moot sub nom.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), vacated as moot sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); see also
United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981). Contra Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir.
1974).
152. J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 252.
153. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 2.




means that emissions from one state shall not, by themselves,
cause a violation of the standards in another state, or that they
may not contribute at all to a violation in another state, or some-
thing in-between. These are not questions susceptible to technical
resolution. Even if there were answers to them, EPA would en-
counter problems in assessing the contribution of sources in one
state to ambient air levels in another.
55
Congress also did not adequately apportion responsibility be-
tween the states' plans and federal controls. The Act's language
on New Source Performance Standards, for instance, was unclear
as to how stringent these standards need be.' 56 Thus, Congress
left unsettled the respective scope of federal and state responsibil-
ity in imposing controls to meet the ambient air standards. The
Act thus did not decide how to allocate the costs of control among
polluters. It also did not decide how to allocate responsibility for
these unhappy choices among the states and between the states
and EPA.
The Act's failure to deal with the allocation of duties under-
cut the pivotal concept of "technology-forcing," which depends on
the imposition of tough emission limits to prod development of
better ways to control pollution. The Act instead created reasons
for firms and industries to avoid developing new technology. 157 A
firm or industry that developed means to control emissions would
likely incur additional costs because EPA would supposedly have
to tighten the applicable New Source Performance Standards,
which are to reflect the best feasible technology. 158 In addition,
states would tend to place more of the burden of reducing pollu-
tion on industries with better means to reduce emissions.
C. The Deflation of the Clean Air Act
The 1970 Act's national mandate to protect health and wel-
fare was challenged not only by the public reaction to the controls
that it implicitly imposed, but also by new public concerns about
energy, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, an economic downturn,
155. See supra note 149; infra notes 188-189.
156. See infra text accompanying note 267.
157. H.R. REP. No. 1013, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3281, 3300 (letter from Russell E. Train, EPA Administrator, to
Carl T. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 22, 1974)). La Pierre,
Technology-forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REv.
771, 774 (1977). See also H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 187, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 107, 1265-66 (coal-fired power plants could
meet standards by burning low sulfur coal instead of using new, more effective
technology).
158. See 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 17. See also Henderson & Pearson,
supra note 54, at 1449 (discussing disincentive for technological development in pro-
vision to reduce emission from new cars).
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and what seemed like endless inflation. The tide was ebbing away
from absolute environmental commitments and flowing towards
efforts to balance environmental with other concerns. The Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974159 empha-
sized holding down the cost of air pollution control, although
without literally lifting the duty to achieve the ambient stan-
dards.1 60 There was also a drawing away from the national de-
signs that had been in vogue during Lyndon Johnson's "Great
Society." For example, national land use legislation seemed likely
in the late 1960s but died in the early 1970s, partly because of
resistance to an enlarged national role in what were seen as state
and local matters.' 61 Yet, the 1970 Act put EPA in charge of a
scheme central to land use decisions. 6
2
The 1970 Act created an embarrassment, legal as well as
political. It had promised that EPA would protect health and
made the promise legally enforceable through a citizen suit provi-
sion.163 The Clean Air Act changed radically as EPA and, ulti-
mately, Congress reacted to the Act's impossible promise, though
they did not admit that the promise would not ultimately be
realized.
While action-forcing was supposed to trigger action to the ex-
tent needed to achieve the Act's goals, it also generated a series of
practices which tried to picture palatable controls as adequate to
reach the Act's goals. The following Table diagrams this for am-
bient pollutants, the most important category. The left column
presents the Act's theory, according to which the action-forcing
procedures would transform the legislative goal of health protec-
tion into the imposition of sufficient controls on sources. The
right column presents the administative practices and legislation,
which will be described, that were used to avoid imposing un-
palatable controls. While the theory was to have worked from top
to bottom, making the goals control the conduct, the practices of
159. Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 792-798
(Supp. V 1981) and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980)).
160. Eg., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(B), (c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
161. J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 211-12.
162. Provisions having the most impact on land use include those dealing with
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), see infra § II(D), nonattainment areas,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (Supp. IV 1980), and indirect sources, id. § 7410(a)(5). Indi-
rect sources are facilities, such as parking lots and shopping malls, which attract mo-
bile sources of pollution, i.e., cars, buses, etc.
163. "To assure that Federal and State agencies aggressively pursue their respon-
sibilities and to supplement their capacities," 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 3,
the Act provided that private citizens could sue either officials or polluters in federal
district court for failure to fulfill duties and, in the court's discretion, receive an award
of attorneys' fees." 1970 Act § 304 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. IV
1980)).
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avoidance worked in the opposite direction with the economically,
technically, and politically feasible conduct leading to redefined
goals, as will be shown.
Table
Action Forcing Under The 1970 Act






Determine ambient air quality
needed to protect health,
regardless of feasibility.
Monitor ambient air quality in
each air qu lity region.
Calculate reduction in emissions
needed to meet ambient standard
in each air quality region.
Adopt limits on emissions
neede to meet ambient
standards.
Firms develop and apply
technology to comply or shut
down.
The goal is realized.
Practice
The goals of the Act
substantially achieved on paper.
TAvoid listing new pollutants.
I
Set ambient standards with eye
to feasibility.
Approve plans with otherwise
inadequate emission reduction
by:
not monitoring worst locations,
manipulating air quality
projections,








IThe problem: an impossible Act.
The Act's deflation stems from the bind in which the Act
placed EPA and the states. The Act ordered them to protect
health. On the other hand, the EPA Administrator could be fired
by the President, 164 and state officials were accountable to state
legislatures and the electorate. EPA and state officials were thus
164. J. QUARLES, supra note 51, documents the constant importance of this possi-
bility during the Nixon administration. There have been instances during the Carter
Administration as well of the White House apparently requiring EPA personnel to
put political loyalty above statutory duty.
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under an absolute health mandate from the 1970 Act and conflict-
ing commands from other sources.
This bind could not readily be escaped on the basis that the
1970 Act was the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause.1 65
The Act did not, as has been shown, really command the states; it
commanded only EPA. For EPA, today's law of the land could
readily enough be amended or the Agency's budget could be cut.
Much of what EPA did to shrink its mandate can be explained by
a desire to preserve a portion of its power and make the most of its
limited resources rather than by bad faith. Indeed, an initiative by
EPA in 1982 to enforce a portion of the Act strictly has been criti-
cized by environmental groups as a technique of the Reagan
Administration to prompt Congress to pass weakening
amendments. 1
66
1. Discretion in enforcement
When the adopted state implementation plans imposed
stronger controls on emissions than authorities were later willing
to enforce, the state or EPA could either not enforce the controls,
or write compliance schedules that allowed sources to postpone
action or to do less than the plan required. 67 Discretion in en-
forcement, while not abolished in the 1970 Act, could readily be
carried to the point of conflict with the action-forcing theory.
That theory ultimately rested on making good the threat to com-
ply or shut down so as to reach the ambient standards. When a
plan was being drafted, easing controls on one source would re-
quire tightening controls on other sources to the extent needed to
meet the ambient air standards. But, in the context of enforcing
the plan, easing controls on one source would trigger no immedi-
ate requirements to tighten controls on the others. 6 8 Discretion in
enforcement thus provided a low visibility way out of the action-
forcing theory. 169
165. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
166. Eg., Shabecoff, Mrs. Gorsuch as a Crusading Tiger? Critics Wonder Why,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1982, § 4, at 13, col. 1. Compare infra text accompanying notes
207-211.
167. 1970 Act § 113(a)(4) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (Supp. IV
1980)). See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 264-69 (1976).
168. Citizens could petition for a revision of the state implementation plan on the
basis that events had made it inadequate to attain the ambient air standards, 1970 Act
§ 110(a)(2)(H) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H) (Supp. IV 1980)), but
this remedy was largely theoretical because it would take much time and resources to
gather up the various low-visibility enforcement actions and shoulder the burden of
proving in litigation that the existing plan was now inadequate.
169. The 1977 Amendments recognized the importance of this enforcement discre-
tion and provided formal methods for what, in essence, became the easing of controls
on a case-by-case basis. See Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the
1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, supra note 54, at 159-76.
19831
UCLA LAW REVIEW
2. Avoidance of unpalatable controls
Discretion in enforcement was not, however, an ideal solu-
tion for states because EPA might insist on enforcing the plans as
written. Private parties, moreover, could invoke the citizen suit
provision. 170 It was obviously preferable to avoid having unpalat-
able controls in a plan in the first place. While state officials in
1972 felt political pressure to honor the Act, '71 subsequent circum-
stances gave impetus to a reaction against the Act's requirement to
put tough controls in state plans to the extent needed to comply
with ambient air standards.
First, the controls on transportation needed to achieve the
ambient air standards in many areas imposed a burden directly on
state and city officials, as managers and regulators of transporta-
tion systems, and on citizen-motorists rather than on large indus-
trial concerns. EPA, anticipating a backlash against
transportation controls, ruled that states could omit such controls
from their initial plans.172 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit later held this delay on transportation con-
trols to be illegal. 173 When states had to submit transportation
control plans in 1973, many states submitted no plan, and only
two submitted a plan that EPA approved. 174 State obedience to
the Act was no longer expected.
A federal district court in California ordered the Agency to
promulgate controls on transportation in Los Angeles. 175 EPA
then issued a plan requiring rationing of gasoline, 176 but public
reaction impelled EPA to drop rationing from its plan in a state-
ment acknowledging that the statute gave it no authority to delete
the strategy.177 The demise of the Los Angeles gas-rationing strat-
egy was followed by administrative and then legislative actions
that avoided the use or enforcement of particularly unpalatable
pollution control strategies.
178
170. 1970 Act § 304(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (Supp. IV
(1980)).
171. See supra notes 141-142.
172. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,486 (1971); 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842, 15,080, 23,085 (1972).
173. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
174. Quarles, supra note 144, at 245 n.22.
175. Riverside v. Ruckelshaus, 4 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
EPA had to promulgate federal transportation controls in other states, too. But
before these plans were ripe for enforcement, Congress had enacted the 1977 amend-
ments that extended the statutory deadline for meeting the ambient air standards into
the 1980s. See infra text accompanying notes 392-394.
176. J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 200-202.
177. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,565 (1976). See also EPA Revokes Gas Rationing Rules Be-
cause of "Adverse Consequences,' 7 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 920, 930-31 (Oct. 22, 1976).
178. Here are two examples. First, the 1970 Act prohibited a state that could not
demonstrate compliance by the statutory deadline from allowing any new source of
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Second, some of the controls that were enforced began to im-
pose real costs. For example, requirements in many plans that
electric utilities burn low sulfur oil or natural gas instead of high
sulfur oil or coal cumulatively caused shortages for the less pollut-
ing fuels. 179 These controls consequently became more expensive
for rate-payers than might originally have been anticipated, par-
ticularly when the first OPEC oil embargo in 1973 raised the price
of oil generally and cut certain supplies of relatively low sulfur
oil. 180
3. Approval of inadequate plans
EPA could do relatively little about those states that submit-
ted inadequate plans or failed to submit plans altogether. The
Agency was unable for years to promulgate functioning plans for
some states.' 8' Accordingly, EPA bent over backwards to approve
whatever plans the states submitted. It used the following
techniques:
a. Avoid monitoring worst locations. Although the Act re-
quired states to attain and maintain the ambient air standards,
EPA, states, and industry found, to their mutual advantage, that
pollution. No new factories meant no new jobs. The state could not allow a new
factory even if it shut down an old source that polluted more than the new one be-
cause the Act's deadlines were to be met regardless of economic impact. So neither
source could operate. Compliance with the statute bowed to political reality; EPA
eventually announced an "off-set policy" that allowed the new plant if the builder
could show that other sources in the area would reduce their emissions to levels below
those required in the state implementation plan. 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979) (codified at
40 C.F.R. § 51 app. S (1982)). Environmentalists criticized the policy, EP4 Hails New
'Bubble Policy' as Money-Saving Regulatory Reform, 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1591
(Dec. 7, 1979); Industry Likes EPA 's 'Bubble Policy' But En'ironmentalists Criticize it,
id. at 1645 (Dec. 14, 1979), but did not bring suit to challenge its promulgation. Thus,
sources of pollution that can reduce their emissions more than required by existing
plans have an economically valuable commodity that they can sell to industries that
wish to locate in the area. Another example of legislative avoidance of unpalatable
pollution control strategies is the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(2)(B)-(D) (Supp. IV 1980), which forbade the Ad-
ministrator to impose parking surcharges and allowed him or her to suspend limits on
parking supply. The 1977 Amendments, § 108(3), (d)(3) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(5), (c)(4), (5) (Supp. IV 1980)), generally extended the past practice as to
parking and gas rationing, forbade federal imposition of controls on new construction
in order to avoid the traffic that it would generate, and effectively removed require-
ments as to toll bridges.
179. H.R. REP. No. 1013, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3281, 3299 (Letter from Russell E. Train, EPA Administrator, to
Carl T. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 22, 1974)).
180. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1484 (burning low sulfur coal was
cheaper than installing scrubbers); H.R. REP. No. 1013, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 34, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3281, 3302 (letter from Russell E.
Train, EPA Administrator, to Carl T. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives (Mar. 22, 1974) (discussing allocation of low sulfur fuels)).
181. E.g., Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1084 n.81.
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the facts were pliable. EPA thus covertly acquired a broad discre-
tion that the Act purportedly had denied it.
The measurement of existing air quality involves a high de-
gree of variation. The Act requires states to deal with the worst
concentration of pollution so as to make the air safe every-
where. 8 2 Determining what is the worst concentration can raise a
host of issues that may sound trivial but can radically change the
cost of compliance: whether the monitor is placed near or away
from a big factory or a busy street, three feet from the ground (like
a child's nose) or on a roof top, or one side of the street rather
than the other. 183 According to a leading expert in air quality
monitoring, such variability makes the concept of ambient air
levels "really silly" as the reference point for a control program.1
84
With such a measure, the state and EPA can make things easier
for themselves by not searching too hard for the worst concentra-
tions of air pollution.
An adequate number of monitors and some consistent prac-
tice in the choice of their location would obviously be needed to
give a modicum of meaning to the concept of "national ambient
air quality standards." Yet the National Commission on Air
Quality found that "existing air monitoring data varies substan-
tially from area to area, generally because of a lack of EPA gui-
dance in the past on monitor siting and data handling, and
inadequate state and local resources."' 8 5 New York City, for ex-
ample, had only three street level monitors for a critical traffic-
generated pollutant through years of controversy over its trans-
portation control plan, although the agencies responsible found
that forty-five monitors were needed and that the three in opera-
tion were unreliable. 8 6 The National Commission on Air Quality
found that state and local governments and industry scrutinize air
quality measurements to avoid "overcontrol" of emissions and
that there is a "tendency for undercontrol of sources."' 18
7
182. 1970 Act § I I0(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
183. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 663 (1st Cir. 1974)
(petitioners challenged the location of a monitor as too close to the street curb); EPA
Internal Memorandum from Robert Kenney to Richard G. Kozlowski on Lead Am-
bient Air Quality, reported in Washington Post, July 11, 1982, at A6, col. I (ambient
lead levels often underestimated because monitors were located too high, too far or
upwind from roadways, or in areas with little traffic); See also NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION, supra note 61, at 74; N.Y. Times, May 26, 1981, at A1, col. 1.
184. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1981, at B8, col. I (quoting Dr. Edward Ferrand).
185. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 13.
186. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, AN ASSESSMENT OF NEW YORK
CITY'S TRANSPORTATION SERVICE AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS AND HEALTH 35-36
(E. Goldstein ed. 1977).
187. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 4.
The findings of the National Commission that tend to throw doubt on the basic
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b. Manipulate air quality projections. Translating a plan's
emissions reductions into predictions of future air quality also in-
volves much uncertainty. For most pollutants, there are no work-
able ways to make the prediction. 188 For others, the margins of
error are large. The states and EPA frequently use a computer-
modeling technique that maximizes emissions from each major
source on a factory-by-factory, smokestack-by-smokestack basis
within the constraint of meeting the ambient air standard on pa-
per, even though the technique can have a margin of error over
100%.189 Modeling also requires accurate data on weather patterns
and emissions inventories which often are not available. 190 The
uncertainties provide room for manipulation. 191 As one EPA
Deputy General Counsel has written, "[w]hen modelling results
began to show that in many cases not only the suggested new pat-
tern of emissions but the existing one as well violated air quality
requirements-thereby suggesting a legal duty to impose more
control-the EPA significantly revised its modelling
requirements."1 9
2
c. Take credit for illusory emission reductions. According to
the National Commission on Air Quality, "some states took credit
for emissions reductions that state and local officials conceded
were not likely to be rigorously implemented in many instances
and which, if implemented, would provide a considerably smaller
emissions reduction than estimated in the revised plans."' 93 An
analysis, sponsored by the National Commission, took a single
implementation plan and asked how much of its claimed emission
reductions were likely to be achieved: '[A]bout one-third is a defi-
nite yes; another one-third is a definite no; and the final third is
structure of the Act are of particular interest because Congress established the Com-
mission, key members of Congress were Commissioners, and its "general conclusion"
was "that the structure of the Clean Air Act is sound and needs refinement instead of
fundamental changes." Id at 4.
188. "Sulfur dioxide is the only pollutant for which accurate models exist for cal-
culating the amount by which emissions must be reduced to meet the standards." Id
at 96.
189. See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 645 F.2d 1349, 1363 (9th
Cir. 1981) (data in one instance indicated a 238% margin of error); Mision Indus. v.
EPA, 547 F.2d 123, 128 (1st Cir. 1976) (EPA conceded a possible random error as
high as 150% for the annual average of pollutant emissions and 200% for short-term
concentrations).
190. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 13, 97.
191. Then EPA Administrator Costle stated:
Modeling is becoming elevated to the same high art of gamesmanship
as lawyering, and often a company finds it cheaper to hire modelers and
lawyers than to put in pollution control equipment.
D. Costle, supra note 20, at 10.
192. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1080 n.70 (change of modeling policy in one
context).




4. Postponing the deadline for attainment of the ambient air
standards
The 1970 Act required the primary ambient standards to be
achieved within three years of the adoption of the state plans, 195
which meant 1975 for the initial group of ambient standards.
EPA could grant an extension of up to two years in special cir-
cumstances, 196 an extension which was routinely allowed, 197 so
that 1977 became the actual deadline..As 1977 approached, it be-
came increasingly evident that the deadlines would not be met in
many locales.198
In 1976 and 1977, as in 1981 and now in 1982, press reports
seemed to say that the Act would "expire" unless Congress re-
newed it.199 But the Act's substantive authority is not subject to
lapse.200 Renewal was and is a euphemism for postponement of
deadlines. The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act extended
the deadline for meeting primary air standards. Congress thus
used time, as it did with the 1970 Act, to mediate the infeasibility
of its absolute promises. In areas where the primary standard had
not yet been attained, the state had to submit a revised plan that,
inter alia, showed "reasonable further progress" towards meeting
the standards in each year to the end that the standard would be
attained by 1982.201 An extra five years, until 1987, could be given
for compliance with the ambient standards for certain pollutants
emitted primarily by vehicles if the state submitted a plan to, inter
alia, use "reasonably available" funds on public transportation
194. Schechter & Plakins, South Coast Air Quality Management Plan." Implementa-
tion and Enforcement Issues in 3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIR QUALITY Los AN-
GELES REGIONAL STUDY-SIP PROCESS REVIEW 4-53 (Energy and Environmental
Analysis, Inc. 1980).
195. See supra text accompanying note 114.
196. See supra text accompanying note 115.
197. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1073 n.43.
198. According to the National Commission, the failures to meet the deadlines
were caused by:
-The inadequacy of certain state regulations;
-Noncompliance by individual sources, coupled with inadequate or
unsuccessful federal and state enforcement;
-Failure of automobiles in use to meet federal exhaust emission regu-
lations; and
-The overall complexities of air pollution control . ...
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 15 (describing failures by 1975).
199. See supra note 166.
200. The budget authorization needs renewal but has been routinely extended.
Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1059 n.2.
201. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172(a)(1), (b), 91
Stat. 685 (corresponding current versions at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1), (b) (Supp. IV
1980))[hereinafter cited as 1977 Act].
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rather than highways to the extent needed to meet "basic travel
needs" by mass transit.20 2 If the state did not submit a plan which
EPA approved, no major stationary source could be located in the
area, 20 3 and the state could become ineligible for certain federal
grants.2°4 From the perspective of clean air objectives, the 1977
Amendments gave the states more time in return for new induce-
ments for state action.
Although the 1977 Amendments' sanctions for the states' fail-
ure to submit adequate plans were a change from the 1970 Act,
205
hardly any states submitted plans or had them approved on sched-
ule.20 6 EPA strove to limit its use of its sanction authority for fear
that Congress would amend the Act to remove that authority alto-
gether.20 7 The denial of federal grants was largely discretion-
ary,208 and so EPA had flexibility. It chose to apply this sanction
to only two states whose transgressions were particularly bla-
tant.2°9 Although the ban on construction was not discretionary,
its practical effect was largely circumvented. 210 EPA, as under the
1970 Act, bent over backwards to approve state plans.211
202. 1977 Act §§ I 10(a)(3)(D), (c)(5)(B), 172(a)(2), (b)(1 1) (corresponding current
versions at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(D), (c)(5)(B), 7502(a)(2), (b)(1 1) (Supp. IV 1980)).
203. 1977 Act §§ 172(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
204. 1977 Act §§ 176(a), 316(a) (current versions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506(a), 7616(a)
(Supp. IV 1980)).
205. Compare supra text accompanying notes 146-147 with text accompanying
notes 201-203.
206. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 16-17, 116.
207. EPA Outlines Policy to Avert Sanctions for Nonapproval of SIPs, 10 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 225 (June 15, 1979); EP.4 to Interpret Liberally Policy For 1982 State
Implementation Plans, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 575, 575-76 (Sept. 11, 1981). When
EPA announced an intention to read the statute more literally, thus threatening to
apply sanctions to many states, environmental groups charged the Reagan Adminis-
tration with trying to scare Congress into enacting the Administration's proposals to
amend the Act. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1982, at 15. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION,
supra note 61, at 16.
208. Among the elements of a fund cut-off is a finding by the EPA Administration
that a governor is not making "reasonable efforts" towards submitting an appropriate
plan. 1977 Act § 176(a) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a) (Supp. IV 1980)).
209. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 16.
210. One device was to approve insufficient plans on the condition that the state
would remedy the insufficiencies. "Conditional approvals" are not recognized in the
language of the statute and seems to read significant administrative discretion into a
critical part of a statute that still purports to be "action-forcing." Id at 17. Condi-
tional approvals have, however, been upheld. See, e.g., Connecticut Fund for the
Env't, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1005-07 (2d Cir. 1982); City of Seabrook v. EPA,
659 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless, the court in Connecticut Fund said that
conditional approval did not allow EPA to lift the ban on construction.
211. Even the National Commission on Air Quality reported:
[The agency] approved virtually all states' projections that they would
meet the air quality standards even though federal, state, and local offi-
cials privately acknowledge that such projections often were based on
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Another device to avoid confrontation over states' unwilling-
ness to adopt plans that would cure violations of ambient air stan-
dards was to take areas previously found to be in violation of the
standards and redesignate them as having an "unclassified" air
quality status on the theory that there were no adequate air quali-
ty data. EPA has approved such redesignations of some forty ar-
eas.212 According to the National Commission, the advantage of
having an "unclassified" status has resulted in an incentive for
states not to develop the data needed to get out of that indetermi-
nate status.
213
5. Setting the ambient air standards to balance health and
economic considerations
The Act forbids the Agency to consider economic costs in set-
ting the primary ambient standards, even though the absence of a
threshold for pollution's health effects means that the standards
must inevitably constitute a balance between health and the costs
of protecting health. The upshot is a fiction. EPA says that it does
not consider the costs of compliance when it sets the primary am-
bient standards, and judicial review proceeds on the theory that
EPA should not and has not considered costs of compliance.214
But EPA prepares a formal analysis of the cost of compliance at
the same time that it sets the standards, 215 and, as Senator Muskie
stated in 1977, the ambient standards represent "pragmatic
judgment."
216
6. Leaving harmful pollutants off the lists
The Act requires the Administrator to deal with all harmful
emissions, whether as an "ambient," "hazardous," or "other
harmful" pollutant. 217 The legislative history mentioned several
dozen pollutants to be covered and predicted that many more
imprecise emission inventories and inadequate projection techniques,
and that they often were overly optimistic.
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 17.
212. Id. at 109.
213. Id. at 108. The Commission noted a study that estimated that "61 percent of
all new coal-fired powerplant generating capacity sited during the 1980's will be lo-
cated in counties that are unclassified for sulfur dioxide because of insufficient moni-
toring." Id.
214. See supra note 112.
215. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 app.
at 136-38 (Supp. V 1981). This order by President Reagan revoked a similar order by
President Carter, Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 app. at 107-09 (Supp. IV 1979).
216. 123 CONG. REC. 18,463 (1977).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
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would be included as information developed. 21 8 Designating pol-
lutants as harmful under certain sections of the Act triggers EPA's
duties. EPA can thus nip its duties in the bud by not designating
pollutants.
EPA has not listed the majority of pollutants that it acknowl-
edges to be harmfu2 19 and has generally avoided listing pollutants
as "ambient" or "hazardous," thereby avoiding the Act's more
telling provisions to prod health protection. As to the "ambient"
category, the 1970 Act itself effectively listed five pollutants, and
the 1970 Act's sponsors expected EPA to list another five within
one month of enactment, with more to follow thereafter.220 One
month after the 1970 Act was signed into law, EPA listed a sixth
pollutant.22' It thereafter refused to list other pollutants, claiming
that listing is within the Administrator's discretion. Finally, EPA
was ordered to list a seventh pollutant, lead, in a decision that
held that listing of pollutants found by EPA to be harmful and
widespread is mandatory. 222 EPA has nonetheless continued a
policy of not listing additional ambient pollutants. 223
The Act's requirement to take particularly fast, unbending
action against hazardous air pollutants has prompted decisions
not to list some of the most significant hazards for fear of the ac-
tion-forcing consequences. 224 Out of the dozens of candidate pol-
lutants, only seven hazardous pollutants have been listed, and
standards have been promulgated for only four of those seven.225
In most cases, congressional or judicial prodding was needed to
get EPA to take action.226
The Act thus began with an action-forcing theory in which
official recognition of pervasive danger would prompt action. In-
stead, the Act produces practices in which the legal duty to take
protective action has prompted decisions not to recognize the
danger.
7. A Defense of the 1970 Act
The National Commission on Air Quality tries to defend ac-
218. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 10-11, 18-21.
219. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 76-79; see also D. Costle, supra
note 20, at 5.
220. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 10-11, 18-21.
221. 36 Fed. Reg. 1515 (1971) (ambient standard for nitrogen dioxide), codified at
40 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1982).
222. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
223. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 8.
224. Id. at 10.
225. Id. at 10, 76-77.
226. Id. at 10, 76.
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tion-forcing under the 1970 Act by claiming progress. 22 7 How-
ever, the Commission's claims are misleading in two respects.
First, the largest reduction-in carbon monoxide--did not come
from the action-forcing mechanism of state plans or ambient air
standards, as the Commission suggests, 228 but primarily from the
controls on new cars,229 the one rule enacted by Congress in the
1970 Act. The state plans have produced at best minimal im-
provements in mobile source pollution.
230
As to stationary sources, the Commission reports that average
annual sulfur ambient concentrations are down 20% from 1973 to
1978.231 But emissions of that pollutant were reduced far less, if at
all, during that period.232 The discrepancy between ambient con-
centrations and emissions may be due to the manipulation of air
quality monitoring. Moreover, some states have achieved the am-
bient sulfur dioxide standard in their regions by building taller
smokestacks that disperse the sulfur emissions rather than reduce
them, thereby increasing acid rain in downwind states. 233 Former
Administrator Costle, even in trying to defend the 1970 Act, ac-
knowledged that sulfur concentrations decreased more from 1964
to 1972 than afterwards and that most of the overall improvement
was due to state activity in the late 1960s "switching from coal to
oil and gas."' 234 The irony of this is that Congress, in 1970, took
the position that the states were laggards to which Congress had to
227. Congress provided for state governments to have primary responsibil-
ity for developing implementation plans for attaining the standards and
broad discretion in how those implementation plans should be
designed. Significant improvements in air quality resulted from imple-
mentation of controls under the 1970 Act. For example: Between 1973
and 1978 average annual concentrations of sulfur dioxide decreased by
20 percent, of suspended particulates by 7 percent, and of carbon mon-
oxide by 33 percent.
Id. at 15.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 28-29, 111.
230. Id. at 18, 131. Of the few transportation control plan strategies that have
been implemented, the type with the most significant impact on air quality is "inspec-
tion and maintenance" of the emission control devices on vehicles. The use of this
strategy had hardly gotten off the ground when the 1977 Amendments made its im-
plementation a rule for states that wished to postpone attainment of the ambient stan-
dards for mobile source pollutants until after 1982. 1977 Act § 72(b)(l 1)(B) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(I 1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980)).
231. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 15.
232. Id at 112 (reporting a 9% reduction from 1970 to 1978). Some, if not all, of
this reduction must be credited to activity that was underway before the 1970 Act.
233. 175 stacks over 500 feet in height have been built since 1970. NATIONAL
COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 238.
234. D. Costle, supra note 20, at 2. See also L. LAVE & G. OMENN, supra note 54,
at I ("The myth of success came from the dramatic gains of the 1950's and 1960's,
partially sustained during the past decade through the 'good luck' of a limping econ-
omy and continuing substitution of oil and natural gas for coal.").
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take a stick. In fact, Congress waved a big stick and took the
credit.
A second reason that the Commission misleads is that it as-
sumes implicitly that the alternative to the Clean Air Act was no
Act at all. That assumption is not realistic. There was potent
public pressure for action to cope with a perceived air pollution
problem.235 Some improvement in air pollution levels since 1970
does not show that a goals statute is an advisable approach any
more than it disproves the contrary hypothesis that the enactment
of a goals statute siphoned off the political pressure in a way that
worked the least possible protection for public health and welfare.
The National Commission's defense of the Act on the basis of
claimed progress in dealing with air pollution also fails to deal
with the question whether more pollution control benefits could
have been achieved at lower costs236 and with less administrative
complexity.
237
D. The Goal of "'Preventing Significant Deterioration" of Air
Quality
Before investigating whether goals statutes or rules statutes
provide a more useful approach, it is necessary to look briefly at
another goal of the Act. In its purposes section, the Act draws
upon the unquestionable goals of health, wealth, and prosperity to
justify a more controversial goal, the protection of natural air
quality.238 The Act's sponsors agreed with Barry Commoner who
holds that "Nature Knows Best. '239 Proponents of the Clean Air
235. See supra § I(A). See also infra note 430.
236. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1469. Compare Smith & Randle, Com-
ment on Beyond the New Deal, 90 YALE L.J. 1398 (1981), with Ackerman & Hassler,
Beyond the New Deal Reply, 90 YALE L.J. 1412 (1981).
237. See supra note 57.
238. See infra notes 249-254 and accompanying text.
239. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 41 (1971). For Commoner, people
who affect nature in ways they think are safe will come to no good. Commoner is, in
Charles Meyers' words, "the biologist who extracts from scientific principles a code
for human conduct." Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought.- Some
Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 IND. J. 426, 441 (1975). Meyers shows that Com-
moner's "laws of ecology" appear to be scientific principles, but are "normative, and
therefore debatable propositions." Id.
Commoner emphasizes the difficulty of predicting the consequences of human
action: "Like the Sorcerer's apprentice, we are acting with dangerously incomplete
knowledge." B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 28 (1966). But since nature is
mute, Commoner's view implies a sorcerer who can tap nature's secrets to assume the
power to allocate the privilege of emission. Power, in this view, should be in the
hands of the ecologist. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE, supra, at 292.
Commoner's dictate that we should be commanded by nature reversed the idea
that the earth was put here for man's domination. "[M]ultiply and replenish the earth
and subdue it," said Genesis 1:28; ecologists repeat the statement without "and subdue
it." S. Fox, JOHN MUIR AND His LEGACY (1981). Yet, there is a link between the
19831
UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:740
Act spoke as if the only opposition to their project of protecting
"nature" from people could come from those propelled by greed
and politics. z4° There is, however, another ecological vision that
disputes the separation of man and nature.24' The dispute over
"man" and "nature" has implications for law and power. Profes-
sor Charles Meyers observed that while Aldo Leopold, the most
eloquent of naturalists, "may recognize that his cherished wilder-
ness values may not be shared by the majority, and while his writ-
ings may constitute an appeal to individuals to know themselves
and change their ways, the environmental movement itself [as rep-
resented by Commoner] would go further to protect society from
itself."242
If Commoner's separation of people and nature is accepted,
people are in trouble. People cannot avoid some emission of air
pollutants. The supporters of the Clean Air Act skirted this ten-
sion in two ways. First, they spoke as if "we" have to breathe
"their" pollution: "industry" pollutes, and the "people" want to
do something about "corporate resistance. ' 243 Few people
thought about emissions from their home furnaces, for instance,
as "pollution." The Act's sponsors did allude to people needing to
do without some luxuries,244 but the guilt was put upon "them,"
view of Commoner and that of Genesis. Both see people as separate from nature;
humans sin in presuming to know of good and evil.
240. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 42,383 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
241. See generally Meyers, supra note 239, at 427-39, 452 (discussing Deist think-
ing and related perspectives). This alternative perspective challenges the very notion
of natural air quality. Why is the decomposition of a fallen log in the forest natural
and good, but its consumption in a furnace unnatural and bad? If the telling differ-
ence is the involvement of man, just what is it about man that is unnatural? Accord-
ing to Lewis Thomas:
We are part of the system. One way to put it is that the earth is a
loosely formed, spherical organism with all of its working parts linked
in symbiosis. We are, in this, neither owners nor operators; at best, we
might see ourselves as motile tissue specialized for receiving informa-
tion-perhaps, in the best of all possible worlds, functioning as a ner-
vous system for the whole being.
L. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 122. In this view, "we cannot stop this controlling," it is
in us; it is "natural." From a different tradition, but similar spirit, are the words of
Chief Seattle:
This we know. The earth does not belong to man; man belongs to the
earth. All things are connected like the blood which unites one family.
All things are connected.
Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. Man did
not weave the web of life; he is merely a strand in it.
Chief Seattle's Message of 1854, reprinted in E. DVORKIN, J. HIMMELSTEIN & H. LES-
NICK, BECOMING A LAWYER 209 (1981).
242. Meyers, supra note 239, at 452.
243. 116 CONG. REC. 32,901 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
244. Air Pollution-1969." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollu-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Public Works (pt. 1), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (state-
ment of Sen. Muskie).
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not "us." Second, the Act's supporters believed that a vigilant sys-
tem could forgive our inevitable sins and protect us from peril.
245
Mandatory goals were a fit response to such images as the "space
ship earth," a planet whose life forms were seen as pervasively
endangered by its human inhabitants. 246 "Spaceship earth" sug-
gested that everybody had a duty to do as much as possible to
clean up the planet. According to Barry Commoner, "[i]f we are
to survive, ecological considerations must guide economic and
political ones.
247
The purported emergency justifying the environmental
movement's claim to power may have been more emotional than
environmental. Aldo Leopold wrote long before the Earth Days
of the late 1960s about what he called the "professional conserva-
tionist" who tries to make people "want what he has to give."
"And why does he call himself a conservationist? Because the
wild things he hunts for have eluded his grasp, and he hopes that
by some necromancy of laws, appropriations, regional plans, reor-
ganizations of departments, or other forms of mass wishing to
make them stay put. ' 24
8
The Act aims "to protect and enhance the quality of the na-
tion's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population. '249 While similar
language was in the Act prior to 1970,250 the 1970 Act seemed to
give force to the notion that reducing emissions should be a goal
independent of the goal of protecting "health" and "welfare,"
which the Act broadly defined to incorporate a range of concerns
including scenic vistas, wild life, and soil productivity.251 The
1970 Act specifically authorized states to do better than meet the
ambient air standards. 252 There were also requirements with a
more direct bite. The New Source Performance Standards, based
on the use of advanced control technology, had to be met whether
or not they would be necessary to meet the ambient air stan-
245. See supra note 37 (statements by Senator Muskie and President Nixon).
Lewis Thomas said, however,
It would be a better world if this were not true, but the fact is that
diseases do not develop just because of carelessness about the preserva-
tion of health. We do not become sick only because of a failure of
vigilance.
L. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 96-97.
246. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3-14 (H. Jarrett ed. 1966).
247. B. COMMONER, supra note 239, at 292.
248. A. LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND OTHER ESSAYS 258 (1966).
249. 1970 Act § 101(b)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. IV
1980)).
250. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, §l(b)(l), 77 Stat. 392, 393 (1963).
251. See supra text accompanying note 95.
252. 1970 Act § 116 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. IV 1980)).
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dards. 25 3 There are, moreover, emphatic statements in the legisla-
tive history that the 1970 Act would not allow any "significant
deterioration" of existing air quality that was better than the am-
bient standards.25
4
As with the promise of protecting health and welfare, the
1970 Act failed both to define the dimensions of the promise to
prevent "significant deterioration" and to decide how the burden
of achieving the promise would be allocated. 255 At least Congress
had created the ambient air standard process to cope with the
"health and welfare" goal. There was no analogous process
geared to "significant deterioration." EPA decided that "signifi-
cant deterioration" was hortatory rather than mandatory. A dis-
trict court held that EPA must require that state implementation
plans include an element to prevent significant deterioration, a
unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion, and so did
an evenly divided Supreme Court.2
56
What thereafter transpired with "significant deterioration"
echoes the experience with the Act's health and welfare promise.
The symbolic commitment to nondeterioration was preserved
through administrative and legislative devices that tended to re-
duce its substance.
257
253. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 2.
254. See, e.g., 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 2. See also Air Pollution-
1970." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution ofthe Senate Comm.
on Public Works (pt. 1), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33, 143 (1970); Hearings on Air
Pollution Control and Solid Waste Recycling Before the Subcomm. on Public Health
and Welfare ofthe House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 280 (1970) (statements of Robert Finch, Sec. of HEW, presented by John Vene-
man, Under Sec. of HEW).
255. Could a clean region allow air pollution to increase toward the ambient air
standard by a lot or a little? Did the meaning of "significant" vary from place to
place? Which potential new sources of emissions could build and which could not?
Would existing sources have to reduce their emissions, even if they did not harm
public health or welfare, to make room for emissions by new homes or industry?
256. Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), a i'd, 4 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), a§'d by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v.
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
257. EPA engaged in a two-year rulemaking process that produced a long, com-
plex regulation seeking to define "significant deterioration" and determine how states
were to prevent it. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,510-17 (1974). Congress incorporated a more
complex version of the EPA regulation into the 1977 Amendments. 1977 Act
§§ 160-169(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (Supp. IV 1980)). The
chief feature is that there shall be three classes of clean areas with the least deteriora-
tion of air quality allowed in Class I areas, more in Class II, and the most in Class III.
The amount of deterioration deemed to be insignificant for each type of area was
expressed in terms of changes in ambient air levels. The regulations required that
certain types of areas, such as large national parks, be included in Class I, id. § 7472,
and otherwise allowed the states broad discretion in deciding how various part of
their states would be classified. Id § 7474. Finally, major new sources may locate in
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III. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AS A GOALS STATUTE
Many of the Act's problems stem from its structure as a goals
statute. Section A of this Part defines the difference between goals
statutes and rules statutes and identifies those aspects of the Act
that fall in each mold. Section B links the Act's goals structure to
specific problems of implementation. Section C argues that simi-
lar problems will tend to arise so long as air pollution is ap-
proached through a goals statute, whether of the action-forcing or
broad delegation variety, or some other type.
A. Distinguishing Goals Statutes and Rules Statutes
A rules statute, as already posited, enacts rules of conduct.
25 8
A goals statute empowers a delegate of the legislature to promul-
gate controls on conduct in line with legislatively expressed goals.
The distinction pivots on the meaning of "rules. ' 259 I use "rule"
as a definition that demarcates permissible from impermissible
conduct in the future. This definition must be stated in terms ex-
trinsic to the decisionmaker rather than incorporating the deci-
sionmaker's judgment. The extrinsic basis of a rule combined
with the intention to apply it to cases as they arise over the indefi-
such areas only if they meet emissions limitations geared to a higher standard of effort
than those required by the New Source Performance Standards. Id § 7475.
Practice differed from promise in ways reminiscent of the promise to protect
health and welfare. For some examples:
-prevention of significant deterioration now applies to only two pollutants, NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 149;
-the supposedly better emission limits on new sources in clean air areas have
proved to be little different than those required under the New Source Performance
Standards;
-"deterioration" does not include increased emissions from many types of
sources, id. at 25; and
-"deterioration" does not include increases in pollution from facilities whose
construction began before January 6, 1975.
For another example, the 1970 Act provided no principles upon which to allocate
the theoretically limited right to increase emissions in clean areas. Under the 1977
Amendments, EPA and the states have generally chosen to use a system of first-come,
first-served. This avoids the sticky problems of weighing all manner of land uses and
predicting future needs. It also means that one can say "yes" to all applications for
the time being, thereby eventually using up the allowance for growth and creating
pressure for statutory amendments.
258. See supra text accompanying note 62.
259. "Rule" means different things to different people. Compare, e.g., Kennedy,
Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 356 n.l (1973) (rules as ironclad), with I F.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 17-19 (1973), and 2 id
at 158 n.4 (1973) (rules constantly developing but never fully developed).
This Article's distinction between "rules" and "goals" is similar to Hart's and
Sacks' distinction between "rules and standards," on the one hand, and "practices and
policies" on the other, except that their definition of "standards" may include "stan-
dards" that lack the extrinsic meaning to meet my view of "rules." H. HART & A.
SACKS, supra note 261, at 155-60.
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nite future gives rules a generality and fairness that have wide
appeal.
260
Statutes that forbade burning coal or keeping pigs in a medie-
val city, for instance, would be rules statutes because they define
what may and may not be done. In contrast, statutes that empow-
ered a commissioner to regulate what trades may be carried on or
what fuels may be burned within the city, with the aim of reduc-
ing odor and soot to generally acceptable levels, would be goals
statutes because the commissioner rather than the statutes would
choose, among the alternatives, what conduct would be forbidden.
Both the rules statutes and goals statutes in these examples have
essentially the same goals, but the goals serve different purposes in
the statutory scheme. In a rules statute, the goal, often stated in a
purposes section, is not the legislative act but rather is the act's
objective which may be used to interpret the rules that are en-
acted. In contrast, in a goals statute, the goal serves as a command
and provides the mandate under which the legislature's delegate
controls conduct. A rules statute thus can state goals as a pream-
ble and probably should do so since an explicit statement of pur-
poses is a better aid to interpretation than a collection of often
conflicting statements in the legislative history.
Whether a statute works to define permissible conduct de-
pends on the context. 261 A statute prohibiting "unreasonable"
emissions may have a reasonably clear meaning in a society where
customs as to polluting activities are fairly well settled, but not
otherwise.262 In contrast, a statute that called on a decisionmaker
to frame controls to achieve precisely stated, albeit conflicting,
goals to the extent practicable would be a goals statute.2 63 Unless
there is a consensus as to how the competitive objectives are to be
balanced and how the burdens are to be allocated, the imposition
of controls will depend, in the final analysis, on the official's
judgment.
260. The word "rules," with its root in the word for ruler or straightedge, connotes
even application of an observable standard. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1986 (revised ed. 1968). These characteristics of rules have basic appeal.
See L. POSPISIL, supra note 42, at 78-81, 240-41.
261. Statutes, or other language for that matter, have meaning only in context. H.
HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1156-57, 1219, 1411, 1415-16 (tent. ed. 1958).
262. Posner's theory that common law doctrines such as nuisance served the goal
of efficiency, R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 44-47 (2d ed. 1977), is not to
the contrary, even if it is an accurate description of what courts did. If courts really
did decide on the basis of whether changes from the status quo created more benefits
than costs, that would not only serve the goal of efficiency but provide an extrinsic
criteria by which to gauge future conduct.
263. For judicial treatment of such a statute, see Consumers Union v. Sawhill, 525
F.2d 1068 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
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The portion of the 1970 Act which provides for ambient air
standards and requires their attainment through state implemen-
tation plans is a goals statute. The goal is the attainment of the
ambient standards. 264 This portion of the statute contains no rule
of conduct; it does not prohibit a source from violating the ambi-
ent air standards, 265 nor would such a prohibition have much
meaning because violations of ambient standards are usually at-
tributable to emissions from many sources. Rather, controls on
conduct are to be established by the states or EPA.266
The section of the 1970 Act which provides for New Source
Performance Standards is also a goals statute. The standards to
be set by the Administrator are to reflect "the degree of the emis-
sions limitation achievable through the application of the best sys-
tem of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of
achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been
adequately demonstrated. '267 Since the statute is silent on the de-
gree to which cost is to be taken into account, this section does not
establish a rule of conduct for new sources to be interpreted by the
Administrator; rather, it requires the Administrator to promulgate
rules based on some unspecified balance between the competing
aims of holding down costs and emissions. The Administrator is
not supposed to rely upon customs or the best current practice in
the industry because the Act's technology-forcing thrust was to
change past practices. 268
The 1970 Act did contain one section that at least superfi-
cially was a rules statute: the section that required auto manufac-
turers to reduce emissions of certain pollutants from new cars by
90% within a certain time.269 Congress, however, provided that
the Administrator might allow a one-year extension to the manu-
facturers.270 Moreover, central to the legislative debate and enact-
ment of the section were commitments from Senator Muskie that,
if auto manufacturers still could not reduce the emissions by 90%
264. "The establishment alone of air quality standards has little effect on air quali-
ty. Standards are only the reference point for the analysis of factors contributing to
air pollution and the imposition of control strategies and tactics. This program is the
implementation plan." 1970 Senate Report supra note 13, at 11-12.
265. Id.
266. This portion of the Clean Air Act is a goals statute not simply because it has a
seemingly quite specific goal whose attainment is mandated through "action-forcing"
procedures. If the Act instead established the goal of achieving "reasonable" reduc-
tions in emissions and mandated that the states or EPA control conduct towards that
end, it would be a goals statute because, like the 1970 Act, controls on conduct would
be established outside the statute.
267. 1970 Act § 11 1(a)(l)(c) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(1)(C) (Supp.
IV 1980)).
268. See infra note 358.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124.
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after a one-year extension, they could return to Congress for fur-
ther relief.2
71
Reducing auto emissions 90% was, read literally, a rules stat-
ute. When read as if conditioned by the express commitment of
the Act's authors to amend the requirements if the manufacturers
made a real effort to comply, the section was not a rule because
there was lacking an intention to apply the 90% requirement in the
future;272 Congress was not about to shut down Detroit and had
not concluded that accomplishing the 90% reduction was feasi-
ble.273 For these very reasons, the leading judicial interpretation
of the 90% reduction requirement dealt with the requirement pri-
marily as a question of policy rather than one of rule
interpretation.
274
The analogous provision in the 1977 Amendments presented
a different story. Congress considered what the auto industry
could feasibly do275 and set minimum standards that the industry
was seriously expected to meet. 276 To this extent, the 1977
Amendments contained an unambiguous rules statute.
Rules statutes, in defining permissible versus impermissible
conduct, set priorities between goals, such as health protection
and the cost of reducing emissions; they also allocate the costs or
benefits of reducing emissions between groups. While goals stat-
utes may purport to make these choices, they do not define con-
duct, and they thus speak at a more abstract level than rules
271. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
272. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81-82 (2d ed. 1969) (one "way not to
make law" is a lack of "congruence between official action and declared rule").
273. 116 CONG. REC. 32,905-06 (1970) (remarks of Sens. Griffin and Muskie).
274. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The EPA Administrator had denied auto manufacturers' applications for a one-year
extension on the basis that the manufacturers had not met one of the statutory prereq-
uisites for extension, a showing that compliance with the emissions reduction require-
ment was not feasible. The court ruled, in essence, that until manufacturers produced
a car that met the statutory requirement, the burden was upon the Administrator to
show that such a car could be produced. There is nothing in the statutory language to
support such a shifting of the burden of proof away from the applicant. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law.- A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF.
L. REV. 1256, 1304 (1981); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Lim-
its of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 381-83 (1974). The court seemed to
be saying rather, in the guise of burden of proof, that Congress could not have seri-
ously meant, as a matter of policy, to take the risk of a rule that left this burden on the
industry. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1558-59.
275. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 237-44, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1316-23.
276. 1977 Act § 201(a) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. IV 1980)).
Unlike the 1970 Act, the 1977 Act allowed for administrative postponement on the
grounds of feasibility for only one of the three named automotive pollutants (carbon
monoxide), and then only for the final reduction in emissions (to take place in 1980),
but not for earlier reductions. This final reduction for carbon monoxide might be
considered a goals statute.
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statutes, which must state their choices in extrinsically meaningful
terms. This relative concreteness of rules statutes makes them bet-
ter able to deal with air pollution, as this Article will show.
It is first necessary, however, to consider whether the differ-
ence between rules and goals is more apparent than real because
all rules need interpretation and all goals reflect some choices.
There is a level at which this is true. Such a seemingly precise rule
as the required 90% reduction in auto emissions needs an interpre-
tation as to what constitutes a 90% reduction within the meaning
of the statute.277 A prohibition against burning coal will occasion
litigation as to whether the ban applies during an emergency
shortage of other fuels, or whether lignite and peat are "coal"
within the meaning of the statute. Some theorists have in fact ar-
gued that no written rule can explicitly answer the entire question
with which it purports to deal.278 Moreover, interpreting rules
often involves reference to their objectives, i.e., their goals,
thereby arguably further undercutting the distinction between
rules and goals statutes.
The distinction between rules and goals, however, has sub-
stance. It was traditionally thought that an interpreter of a rule
did not fill in a gap, but rather made manifest a part of the rule
that had previously been latent. 279 In contrast, the legislature or
policymaker was said to create a new dictate. While this tradi-
tional account may make rules sound too much like Platonic
forms stowed in a legal freezer for judges to defrost, there is a
truth in the traditional account because the rule interpreter and
the policymaker ought to base their decisions on different sorts of
rationales. The rule interpreter should, as a matter of principle,
focus upon indications of the legislature's choice of standards ap-
plicable to individuals in situations like that at hand, while the
policymaker should focus on the consequences of his choice upon
society.280
Even if the difference between arguments of principle and
policy is described as one of style rather than substance, the dis-
tinction between rules statutes and goals statutes still has force. A
rules statute requires the legislature to express itself on what is
permissible and impermissible in a range of situations, while a
goals statute allows the legislature to deal solely with objectives.
For instance, the requirement to meet an ambient air standard
might lead to a given source having to shut down, to reduce emis-
277. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Ruckelshaus, 359 F. Supp. 1028
(D.D.C. 1972).
278. Dworkin, Is Law a System fRules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 52 (R.
Summers ed. 1968). See also H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 261, at 156.
279. 1 F.A. HAYEK, supra note 259, at 83-84.
280. Dworkin, "Hard Cases," 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1058-60 (1975).
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sions 50%, or to do nothing different, depending upon the choices
made by a state or the EPA. In contrast, a rules statute, even one
requiring much interpretation, reflects choices because it estab-
lishes extrinsic standards. Accordingly, one can say that in using
the values inherent in the statute's manifest choices, the rule inter-
preter is expressing the legislature's latent choice.
Rule interpretation is also self-limiting in that a rule inter-
preter may not ordinarily change an interpretation, while the ad-
ministrator of a goals statute is supposed to shift the controls to
meet changing times.28' Accordingly, gaps in rules tend to get
filled, thereby reducing the room for further interpretation.
To say that the distinction between rules and goals is substan-
tial is not to say that it is a bright line. It may be a slippery slope.
If, for instance, a prohibition against "unreasonable" emissions is
a rule within a society with well-settled customs, this prohibition
loses its standing as a rule by degrees if the customs of that society
gradually dissolve.
Whether a statute is a goals statute or a rules statute may also
depend on the judicial and administrative milieu in which it is
applied. Take, for instance, the prohibition on "unfair methods of
competition" in the 1914 Federal Trade Act.2 82 The proscription
was meant to allow the Federal Trade Commission to interpret
and enforce an existing common law cause of action, albeit more
freely than the courts of that time. 283 While the rule was loosely
textured and left the Commission scope for interpretation, just as
common law concepts such as "offer and acceptance" leave courts
room for interpretation, there would still be major categories of
conduct that clearly would or would not be "unfair methods of
competition" in 1914. The statute left the Commission an entirely
smaller and different kind of power than one that would have au-
thorized the Commission to issue such regulations as further the
ultimate goals of the Act. Similarly, the "just and reasonable"
standard for establishing public utility rates was understood to do
more than tell the utility commission to think about the goals of
the regulatory scheme in considering the profits that a utility
should have an opportunity to earn; there was a benchmark for
281. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 261, at 155-70.
282. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
283. See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920) (interpreting the provision as not
prohibiting "practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals. . . or as
against public policy"); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 261, at 169-70, 1140-41.
See also FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). R.F Keppel has been
characterized as holding that "section 5 of the FTC Act and its prohibition of 'unfair
methods of competition' were to be interpreted liberally in light of developing com-
mercial practices and community standards." G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H.
BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 436 (2d ed. 1980).
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utility profits based upon comparability to earnings on similar in-
vestments.284 It may be, however, that the Federal Trade Act and
public utility statutes have been used increasingly as goals statutes
in recent decades in which there have been greater investments of
power in administrative agencies.
285
The inability to distinguish between rules statutes and goals
statutes in ironclad fashion does not undercut the use I propose
for the distinction.286 The action-forcing procedures of the Clean
Air Act that are goals statutes and the rules alternatives that I will
suggest are exemplars of their types. More generally, rules stat-
utes have important characteristics that are not critically undercut
by the need to interpret such statutes. These characteristics, all
flowing from the comparatively concrete way in which rules stat-
utes express choices, are: (1) the making of compromises in the
course of enactment; (2) the tendency to create controls on con-
duct that are general in scope and relatively simple to administer;
and (3) the need for the legislature to take responsibility for the
costs as well as the benefits of its program. Goals statutes' lack of
these characteristics have hampered efforts to deal with air
pollution.
B. The Problems With Legislating Clean Air Goals
The 1970 Act tried to deal with the past failure of broad dele-
gations to fulfill expectations by establishing precise goals, not
284. E.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). "The controlling principle came to
be known as the rule ofSmyth v. Ames... " L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 43 (1976). The comparable earnings method
for calculating required utility revenues of course provides "only a very rough ap-
proximation of the amount one would have to pay shareholders to put up capital were
the industry in a competitive, rather than a regulated, environment." Breyer, Analyz-
ing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92
HARV. L. REV. 547, 563 (1979).
285. According to L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, supra note 284, at 43-44, the "rule
of Smyth v. Ames" was set aside by FTC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944) for an "'end result' rule." As to trade practices and the FTC, Gellhorn and
Robinson speak of "the recent efforts of the FTC, with apparent judicial sanction, to
expand its power to police 'unfair or deceptive practices' into a general mandate to
safeguard the American public against a wide assortment of consumer ills." Gellhorn
& Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 776 (1975).
They, more generally, argue that with fading emphasis on questions of legislative
delegation and on the foundation of agency powers in legislation, "many commenta-
tors and all too many administrators and courts seem to overlook this seeming obvi-
ous point in the course of affirming broad and protean administrative powers which
go far beyond anything that is discernible within the creative statutes." Id. at 775.
286. This Article suggests a "policy" in favor of rules statutes, at least in the case
of air pollution. A "rule" against "goals statutes" would require a clearer distinction
than a "policy." I plan to undertake further analysis of the rule statute-goal statute




rules.287 As such, the Act treated the symptom, administrative
drift, rather than the cause, the controversiality of promulgating
controls on conduct. Dealing with the symptom made the under-
lying cause of the regulatory malaise even worse. Congress not
only left core conflicts unresolved, but also made it appear that the
legislation had resolved them. This illusion undercut EPA's legiti-
macy. Moreover, the procedures that Congress used to construct
the illusion multiplied the workload. All this made it difficult for
EPA, the states, business, and environmental groups to do what
was still necessary to resolve the conflicts under the Act-join is-
sue, complete the procedures, reach decisions, and enforce them.
1. Inability to join issue
If the legislature had enacted rules of conduct, it would have
had to confront the inevitable trade-offs between health risks and
pollution control costs. The Act, however, obscured the central
issue by simply mandating that "health" be protected.288 Thus,
Congress avoided the kind of controversial decisions that Jaffe's
theory would suggest that the legislature itself must make.289 The
upshot was there was no effective mechanism to settle these issues.
The great power that the Act ostensibly gave to the Administrator
substantially rested, both in statutory language and in Congress'
explanations to the public,290 upon health being an objective con-
cept, capable of actual demonstration in the field of air pollution.
Because it was not, the health protection club that the Act suppos-
edly gave to the Administrator turned out to be a liability.29'
287. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1476, calls this an "ends-forcing"
approach.
288. Dr. Lewis Thomas, in writing about the use of "health" in another govern-
mental context, warned:
Sooner or later, we are bound to get into trouble with this word
["health"]. It is too solid and unequivocal a term to use as a euphe-
mism and this seems to be what we are attempting. I am worried that
we may be over doing it, taxing its meaning, to conceal an unmentiona-
ble reality that somehow we have agreed not to talk about in public. It
won't work. Illness and death still exist and cannot be hidden.
L. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 96.
289. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
291. EPA has had to argue that it could not issue standards under the Act unless it
could make legislative-type policy judgments and act on hypothesized risks. Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977). See also D. Costle, supra note 20, at 19. Davis has characterized Ethyl Corp.
as dealing with "factual questions that science has not answered." 1 K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:16, at 525 (2d ed. 1978).
Because EPA is supposed to be setting standards to protect health with a margin
of safety, it must look for levels of exposure where health consequences are barely
discernible. Accordingly, in the words of one EPA scientist, EPA is "always setting
the standards at a level where the data is lousy." Statement of Dr. Roger Cortesi,
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EPA must, moreover, hide its balancing of the costs and ben-
efits of pollution control from public scrutiny and judicial review.
It may not officially admit that it is considering the cost of control
without risking judicial reversal. The Agency is thus vulnerable
to charges of being stiff-necked in refusing to acknowledge the re-
ality that some costs are large and some risks are small. The Act
pressures industry to take a stance that mirrors that of EPA be-
cause the Act requires that health harms be removed at any cost.
The result is that public issues involving major risks, costs, and
inconveniences frequently are not dealt with directly in adminis-
trative decisions and judicial review of these decisions, but are
submerged in technicality.
2 92
It might be argued to the contrary that the problem was not a
failure to join issue and make a choice in 1970 but a collapse of
resolve in the years that followed. There was indeed a shift in the
political climate unfavorable to pollution control, but the policy
choice made in 1970 was more apparent than real because it was
made at an abstract level. The clean air advantages were not
matched against the costs of control. When the 1970 Act was be-
ing debated, relatively few people could have had any clear idea
of what its formulae, stated in terms of ambient air standards and
time schedules for state implementation plans, would logically re-
quire by way of controls on conduct. Estimating the Act's conse-
quences would have required interpolating the complex
requirements within its text with information about the levels at
which EPA was expected to set ambient air standards and the am-
bient air levels in various locales. One indication of the lack of
understanding of the Act's implications is that no one sought judi-
cial review of the primary ambient air standards promulgated in
1971, which had to be achieved by 1977.293
2. Inability to complete the Act's procedures
A goals statute requires that a delegate go through procedures
to decide upon the controls on conduct that a rules statute would
already embody.294 EPA has been unable to handle the 1970
transcript of meeting of the Science Advisory Board panel on photo-chemical oxi-
dants, at 1-135 (contained in EPA docket on ozone standard).
292. See supra § II(C)(5).
293. There was a challenge to one of the secondary standards, which were of less
legal consequence. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
294. A rules statute might provide for interpretative rules to be issued prior to
bringing enforcement action. For instance, a statute might require firms to use the
best pollution control techniques employed in the industry, as defined by EPA. Such
a statute would not be self-executing, but the Agency would have a task that is less
complicated and discretionary than the decision that EPA is supposed to make in
issuing new source performance standards. See supra note 267 and accompanying
text; infra note 358 and accompanying text.
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Act's procedures for translating its goals into controls, partly be-
cause the action-forcing procedures were so cumbersome and
complex. The Act was to deal with each harmful pollutant by
considering its impact at all places and from all sources. More-
over, there were to be separate plans for each pollutant for each
air quality region in every state. Many states have multiple "air
quality controls regions. ' 295 Furthermore, there may be separate
plans in each region to attain the primary standard, attain the sec-
ondary standard, maintain them, or prevent significant deteriora-
tion of air quality. Massachusetts recently divided itself from one
into 351 regions for "prevention of significant deterioration" pur-
poses.296 Finally, the states revise their plans quite frequently, 297
and EPA must approve or disapprove each adoption or revision of
a plan in a rule-making proceeding.
298
The administrative overload imposed upon EPA and the
states is felt in many ways. For example:
-EPA is sometimes years behind in approving or disapprov-
ing state plan revisions. This delay affects industry's application
of the plan and sows confusion as to what version of the plan
should be enforced.29
9
-EPA has established New Source Performance Standards
for only a fraction of the industries that Congress expected to be
covered. As of 1977, EPA had not strengthened any of the
promulgated standards, although Congress expected these stan-
dards to be tightened in response to new technology. 3°
-EPA and the states sometimes do not know what a "plan"
requires.30' When the defendant in one enforcement suit de-
manded in discovery to see the "plan," EPA could not produce
295. Air quality control regions may be different for different pollutants and dif-
ferent purposes. By 1977, there were 247 air quality control regions. W. RODGERS,
supra note 16, at 211.
296. 46 Fed. Reg. 40,190 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 81 (1982)).
297. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1076-77; NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61,
at 99-102.
298. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1078-79 n.66.
299. Florida has had 19 revisions awaiting EPA action since 1974. NATIONAL
COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 101-02.
300. Before 1977, EPA had promulgated final standards for twenty-four source
categories, NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 225, and revised none, Note,
Forcing Technology, supra note 121, at 1715 n.8. Congress, disappointed by EPA's
inaction, see H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 187, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1077, 1266, responded by requiring EPA to identify and
list all remaining categories of sources, and to adopt standards for 25% of those cate-
gories within two years of their listing, 75% within three years, and the remainder
within four years. 1977 Act § 109(a) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(f) (Supp. IV
1980)). Since then, EPA has promulgated final standards for seven more source cate-
gories and revised two. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 225. However,
EPA has not met the deadlines of the 1977 Amendments. Id.
301. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 102.
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the documents and had to dismiss in a settlement that awarded
attorney fees to the defendant.
30 2
Congress has reacted to the problems caused in part by ad-
ministrative overload by imposing additional duties on EPA.
30 3
For instance, the 1977 Amendments dealt with uncertainty about
the contents of plans by requiring EPA to "publish" all plans at
least annually.30 4 Compliance with this mandate would be tanta-
mount to publishing the contents of a bank of filing cabinets30 5 as
the filing proceeds. The National Commission report published in
1981 stated that "it is seldom possible to obtain a copy of the cur-
rent federally approved implementation plan for a given state."
30 6
The Act's procedures are not merely out of proportion to the
resources available, but also the procedures require the Agency to
exercise skills that do not exist. EPA's duty to check plans and
proposals to gauge their impact on air quality rests on a spurious
notion of technology's ability to predict air quality for most pollu-
tants subject to ambient air standards. EPA has avoided recogniz-
ing harmful pollutants partly because these other pollutants
present even greater problems of prediction. The most publicized
of these is "acid rain," which results from sulphur and other pol-
lutants going through chemical transformation in the atmosphere
resulting in acid deposits hundreds of miles away.307 Acid rain is
a serious problem and probably can be alleviated by reducing
emissions of these chemicals. 30 8 But EPA cannot employ the
Clean Air Act against this hazard because the applicable mecha-
nisms, ambient air standards and state implementation plans, re-
quire the translation of health and welfare effects into ambient
goals and ambient goals into emission controls on distant sources.
EPA Administrator Costle has warned that the Agency is not
"smart enough" to do this for acid rain.309
3. Inability to decide
A goals statute requires the legislature's delegate to make de-
302. United States v. Apache Powder Co., Civ. No. 78-058 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21,
1978).
303. Eg., 1977 Act §§ 109(d), 111(f), 122 (current versions at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7409(d), 741 l(f), 7422 (Supp. IV 1980)).
304. 1977 Act § 110(h) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(h) (Supp. IV 1980)).
305. See the characterization of the 1979 plan revision in Pederson, supra note 57,
at 1082.
306. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 14.
307. See generally, e.g., Berle, Clean Air Act, EPA Shortcomings Cloud the Effort to
Halt Acid Rain, Nat'l L.J., June 9, 1980, at 27, col. 1. But see Rahn, A Statement of
New Evidence, ENVTL. F., May, 1982, at 27.
308. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 42.
309. Two Former EPA Officials Criticize PSD Regulations, 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1599 (Dec. 7, 1979).
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cisions about controls on conduct. The 1970 Act put EPA and the
states in positions where they often were unable to make decisions
because of contradictions between what the statute required and
the political process allowed.310 The abstractness of the Act dis-
tanced Congress from responsibility for the logical consequences
of its commands and allowed individual Congressmen to criticize
EPA for the controls necessary to implement a clean air program
for which they voted. EPA was, moreover, cast by the Act in the
role of technician, not as a maker of policy, to protect health on
the basis of value choices that Congress had made.
EPA has accordingly tried to dispose of issues without seem-
ing to make policy decisions. A realistic sense of its own limited
ability to make difficult choices has played a role in EPA's ten-
dency, for example, to avoid listing harmful pollutants, to bend
over backwards to approve state plans, and to avoid imposing
sanctions on states not submitting adequate plans.
A particularly glaring example of avoidance is that EPA has
never acted on the basis that sources contribute to ambient levels
in a downwind state. EPA has never issued a regulation interpret-
ing the 1970 Act's ambiguous directive that sources in one state
not interfere with another state's achievement of the ambient air
standards. 311 While states have petitioned EPA for relief from in-
terstate pollution, the Agency has avoided decision. 312 To com-
pensate for its failure to remedy this problem, EPA allows states
to ignore pollution from other states in determining the adequacy
of their plans.3 13 This is surely a Kafkaesque turn to an Act
whose first stated reason for being is that air pollution crosses state
and local boundaries.314
4. Inability to enforce
To be effective, the controls on conduct stated in the text of a
rules statute or generated under a goals statute must be enforced.
It is more difficult, as a general matter, to enforce the controls of a
goals statute.
Rules statutes tend to impose requirements of more general
applicability than goals statutes. Under the Clean Air Act, for in-
stance, different emission limits may apply to different factories
within the same industry and region. Conduct controls under
rules statutes also tend to endure longer because to change the
controls requires legislative rather than administrative action. An
310. See generally W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977).
311. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 40, 237.
312. Id. at 41, 237-39.
313. Id. at 20, 141.
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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expectation of changing controls is one of the reasons given for
delegating the promulgation of controls; rules statutes, on the
other hand, may create some expectation of constancy through
time.31
5
The Clean Air Act offers numerous opportunities to change
the controls applicable to any one source because each control is
based upon "a huge number of highly uncertain explorations into
modelling, monitoring and meteorological impacts, emissions in-
ventories and so on."' 316 A source conceivably can get relief from
a control by convincing the regulator that any one of a large
number of measurements or calculations is wrong, has changed,
or that policy considerations dictate a different apportionment of
clean-up burdens.
317
The lack of generality and the variability of controls under
goals statutes induce sources to contest enforcement at every stage
in the hope that some type of relief may be granted before compli-
ance is necessary. Thus, any predisposition to go ahead and com-
ply with the Clean Air Act in order to get it over with must begin
to bow to the sense that only a sucker would go along when his
competitors might get easier treatment through resistance. 318
Rules statutes tend to carry more moral suasion, not necessar-
ily because the public has more regard for legislatures than agen-
cies, but because of the type of controls that legislatures are likely
to produce. Legislated controls, being more general, can be sup-
ported by the argument that no one should be able to disobey a
rule applicable to all. Moreover, controls generated by action-
forcing statutes such as the Clean Air Act can be draconian, while
controls enacted by a legislature will tend to reflect compromises
that can be defended as reasonable. Furthermore, enacting rules
tends to be seen as defending the community against conduct that
is "wrong" as a matter of principle, while allocating burdens
under a goals statute can be seen as making private actors serve
public policy. The Clean Air Act treats the choice of controls on
conduct as a matter of policy, not principle. 31 9 The violation of
315. L. FULLER, supra note 272, at 77-79 (treats a minimum degree of "constancy
through time" as a prerequisite of an effective law). This expectation of constancy
may also be connected with a sense of even-handedness.
316. D. Costle, supra note 20, at 19; see also Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1076-77.
317. Pederson, supra note 57, at 1073-78.
318. Rickles, Environmental Rules Mess, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1978, at A19, col. 3.
Non-compliance penalties were provided in the 1977 Amendments in an effort to
remedy this problem. 1977 Act § 120 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. IV
1980)). They have been used only rarely, NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at
39, and are not adequate to solve the problem.
319. An example of the Act's inability to generate standards of legal right and
wrong came up in the debate to create a Synthetic Fuels Corporation. In response to
concerns that synfuels plants would create environmental problems such as the emis-
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policy-based controls is less likely to be considered shameful than
the violation of generally applicable controls whose purpose can
be widely understood as preventing harm.
320
The authors of the 1970 Act tried to base its "comply or shut-
down" enforcement stance on the principle that the "health of
people is more important than [what is] technically feasible."
321
Knowing, however, that "health" in the environmental context is
a relative concept, the authors could not have meant what they
said. Neither was such an extreme viewpoint likely to elicit the
public support necessary for compliance.
322
The 1970 Act, by getting ahead of public opinion, helped to
sion of carcinogenic air pollutants, EPA assured Congress that "EPA and DOE both
believe that with appropriate controls, synthetic fuel processes can be developed con-
sistently with public health and environmental quality standards." Letter from
Charles S. Warren, Director, Office of Legislation, to Sen. William Proxmire (July 25,
1979), reprinted in Hearings on Energy Financing Legislation Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 817 (1979). Yet there
are no ambient air standards for these air pollutants, nor is EPA likely to regulate
many of them as hazardous pollutants. The EPA "standards" would most likely be
New Source Performance Standards, based upon considerations of economic and
technical feasibility. EPA must take account of the differences between plants and
processes in determining feasibility. National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452
n.128 (D.C. Cir. 1980). So it is not just that synfuels plants would have to meet a set
of standards, but also that the standards could be shaped to various synfuels processes
and plants.
320. Harry Wellington has argued that duties based upon principle, which he calls
"strong duties," tend to be enforced more vigorously than duties based only on policy,
which he calls "weak duties." Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards.- Some Notes onAdjuciation, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 229-235 (1973). See
also L. FULLER, supra note 272, at 42-43, 92-93; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 261-67 (1968) ("immorality" and "harm to others" as limits on
criminal sanctions).
321. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 2.
322. For the law to be effective, according to Learned Hand, "it must be content to
lag behind the best inspiration of its time until it feels behind it the weight of such
general acceptance as will sanction its pretension to unquestioned dictation." L.
HAND, The Speech of Justice, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 15-16 (I. Dilliard 2d ed.
1953).
The characteristics of clean air regulation that undercut compliance involve the
lack of attributes that students of law have found distinguish law from power. L.
POSPISIL, supra note 42, at 78-81, includes as one of the attributes of law an "intention
of universal application," which the Clean Air Act lacks because of both its individu-
alized limits and the intention to change those limits. When there is no requirement
that law be applied universally, those in authority rule by power not law.
Authoritarian law ...is not internalized by a majority of the
members of a group. A strong minority which supports the legal au-
thority has elevated such a law as an "ideal" and may have simply
forced the rest of the people to accept it. In some cases this kind of law
is internalized only by the legal authority. An authority may even im-
pose the law for reasons beneficial to himself, without believing in its
propriety. In other cases the law owes its authoritarian quality to insuf-
ficient time for its internalization; opposing members of the group com-
ply with it only under pressure of the authority and the strong minority
who already have internalized it. The majority of the population con-
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work a strange transformation. There was in 1970, and is today, a
widespread and apparently deep concern about pollution, a con-
cern that could provide real punch to the enforcement of fair and
realistic controls. Within a few years, however, the 1970 Act had
begun to generate broad-based resistance. One example was the
reaction to the proposed shut-off of gasoline in Los Angeles.323
For another, when no-lead gasoline was hard to get, many drivers
used leaded gasoline in recent model year cars, harming their
emission control devices. 324 For still another, many drivers in
New York325 and later in Los Angeles 326 disobeyed rules against
their using express traffic lanes designed to speed buses and car
pools and reduce the number of vehicles on the roads. Even the
report of the National Commission on Air Quality suggests that
federal and state officials charged with enforcement routinely
manipulated the Act to avoid its requirements.327 Such exper-
iences reduce the extent to which guilt can help to make a system
of law work.
Rules statutes, it is true, can also lack generality or widely
accepted purposes and so engender similar compliance problems.
However, political and time pressures on the legislature help to
discourage these features in rules statutes.
The problems created by the goals structure of the 1970 Act
went to the heart of its ability to formulate and enforce a societal
choice. This is not to deny that the 1970 Act has had its accom-
plishments or to say that its goals structure was the only source of
the difficulties encountered. The desire to have clean air without
giving up any material benefits was another important cause of
difficulty. Nevertheless, the goals structure abetted the failure to
compromise by casting the legislative act into a form where we did
not have to be called to account for the inconsistencies in our
wishes.
Another cause of the Act's problems reportedly has been less
than stellar administration by EPA. 328 EPA's administration,
however, probably compares well with that of other federal agen-
siders the law unjust and feels no guilt in violating it; there is only fear
of detection (viz., the U.S. prohibition law of the 1920s).
Id. at 196.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 175-178.
324. EPA Conducts Gas Switching Survey, to Back Legislation to Combat Problem,
8 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1342 (Dec. 30, 1977); Price Spread Increases Leaded Gas Use in
Autos Requiring Unleaded Gasoline, 8 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 917 (Oct. 14, 1977); EPA
Suspends MMT Ban Enforcement to APert Shortage of Unleaded Fuel, 10 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 192 (June 8, 1979).
325. N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at 39, col. 1 (New York drivers).
326. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, at 14, col. 4 (Los Angeles drivers).
327. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 140.
328. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1469.
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cies, at least until recently. 329 EPA is a ready target for criticisms
of inefficiency. Because it is supposed to be guided by a rigid stat-
ute, EPA is not well placed to explain policy choices that it is not
supposed to make. Critics of the Agency urge a "creative" read-
ing of the statute that would let the Agency act in a way they
believe to be efficient. 330 More important than the statutory con-
straints, however, are the political constraints surrounding the is-
sues that Congress did not decide. 331 Critics that would have the
agency do more also tend to focus on a single issue. 332 EPA has
many more duties than it can handle even "uncreatively." 333
C. The Difficulty of Repairing a Goals Statute
Treating air pollution through goals statutes of any form
would tend to leave fundamental problems. 334 The difficulty
stems from the need for goals statutes either to make some goals
absolute or to give a delegate of the legislature discretion to
choose between goals, i.e., to allocate costs and benefits. Placing
absolute priority on a goal is appropriate in relatively few in-
stances. Leaving the delegate with discretion, however, engenders
concerns about agency unwillingness to grapple with controversial
issues and/or agency capture, concerns seen variously in Jaffe's
analysis of the broad delegation mode 3 35 and in the background
of the 1970 Act.336 The problem for the drafter of a goals statute
is to find a suitable middle ground between absolutism and open-
ended discretion. Courts, it is true, can play a role in controlling
agency discretion, but there are doubts about how effective courts
can be in any but the test cases and whether a broad judicial role
329. Yet the [EPA) people who shaped the 1979 decision are remarkable
for their high intelligence and conscientiousness. Their failure to make
sensible policy is a symptom of organizational, not personal break-
down-a failure to give decisionmakers bureaucratic incentives to ask
the hard questions raised by any serious effort to control the
environment.
Id.
330. Id. at 1479.
331. Ackerman and Hassler's "creative" approach to the problem was opposed by
eastern coal interests. Whether or not their solution was preferable to EPA's, Acker-
man and Hassler do not face up to the political power of eastern coal in mentioning,
for instance, that there will always be two senators from West Virginia. Id. at 1570.
For example, in 1977, the chairmen of the House and Senate committees with juris-
diction over EPA as well as the Senate Majority Leader were from West Virginia.
332. See, e.g., id. Most litigation against EPA attacks its performance in a single
area.
333. Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1979), af'd sub
nom. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 617 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
334. This is not to say, of course, that improvements in the 1970 Act as a goals
statute are not possible.
335. See supra § I(C).
336. See supra § I(A).
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does not turn the judge into a super-bureaucrat. 337
The 1970 Act's solution was the product of heavy intellectual
firepower, making discretion depend on a multiplicity of in-
dependent variables such as whether the goal is health or welfare,
what the type of pollutant is, whether the countervailing value is
economic or technological feasibility, and a number of other fac-
tors. It is hard to imagine Congress controlling discretion in a
more intensive way. As shown, however, the states and EPA
found ways to respond to priorities other than those of the 1970
Act.
Is there a way to amend the Clean Air Act into a goals statute
that works well? The problems with the 1970 Act cannot be
solved by making clean air an absolute priority. Neither is it sug-
gested that EPA be given the wide discretion over ends and means
in the field of air pollution that agencies operating under a broad
delegation model have over social issues with a less far-flung im-
pact. An EPA with such a wide mandate would probably be op-
posed by all relevant constituencies-industry which would be
subject to its discretion; federal agencies and state and local gov-
ernments whose programs such an EPA might override; and envi-
ronmentalists who would fear that such an EPA might allow
substantial increases in pollution.338 Rules statutes avoid both ab-
solutism and delegating choices of priorities. Neither is necessary
because the rule of conduct in the statute itself expresses the
priority.
Another advantage of the rules statute approach is ease in
correcting or compromising past choices. For example, when auto
manufacturers claimed that they could not comply with the osten-
sible rule concerning emissions from new cars in the 1970 Act,
Congress was able in 1977 to compromise on another set of num-
bers with which auto manufacturers generally did comply. 33 9 The
compromise limits have reduced emissions of two pollutants by
96% and a third by 76%, compared with pre-1968 vehicles.
340
Consider in contrast the problem confronting Congress con-
cerning the goals statute aspect of the 1970 Act making 1977 the
337. See infra § V(C); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68, 68-69 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (en banc) (Bazelon & Leventhal, J.J., concurring), cer. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1977).
338. The proposed Energy Mobilization Board would have had something of this
broad ranging power. Even hedged with safeguards limiting its activities to relatively
few projects, it was defeated by a coalition of environmentalists and conservative
groups concerned with the autonomy of state and local government interests. See 38
CONG. Q. 3498 (Dec. 6, 1980).
339. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 29. As to the waiver provisions for
auto emissions, see supra note 276.
340. Id. at 29. The devices in use do not function as well as the prototypes, partly
because of the lack of an emission inspection program. Id. at 31-32.
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absolute deadline for compliance with the primary ambient air
standards. 341 Was Congress to give EPA discretion to incorporate
considerations of feasibility in the ambient air standards? Or was
Congress to give EPA and the states discretion as to when the
standards should be reached? Either move would have created
vast areas of discretion, all but gutting the action-forcing provi-
sions of the statute. In compromise, Congress tried to walk a
tightrope between action-forcing and discretion by requiring each
state to adopt a plan that would make "reasonable further pro-
gress" each year towards achieving the primary ambient standards
in 1982.342 States might take another five years in the case of cer-
tain pollutants if various conditions were met.343 Congress dealt
with its dilemma, in other words, by superimposing on the old
procedure a new procedure which had embedded within it various
areas of compromise and potential discretion. A questionable
control on discretion was purchased at a heavy cost in procedural
complexity.
The deadline compromise is only one example of Congress
avoiding choice in clean air legislation by creating additional lay-
ers of procedure.344 As a result, the 1977 Act is about three times
longer than the 1970 Act. The complexity makes for repeated er-
rors in legislative drafting 345 and makes administrative procedures
even more cumbersome than those under the 1970 Act.346 More-
over, the peace purchased by Congress proved transitory. As the
new state plans contemplated under the 1977 Amendments were
still being adopted and approved, hearings began in 1981 for
amendments to the Act in anticipation of the 1982 deadline estab-
lished by the 1977 Amendments. 347 A decade of immense polit-
341. See supra text accompanying notes 194-197.
342. See supra text accompanying note 201.
343. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
344. See Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments, supra note 54, at 201-03. See also, e.g., supra notes 303-304 and ac-
companying text.
345. See infra note 421. See also Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578 (1980)
(construing the phrase "any other final action"); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (construing the phrase "emission standard"). The many
technical and conforming amendments later enacted, Pub. L. No. 95-190, § 14, 91
Stat. 1393, 1399 (1977), also indicate the complication and imprecision in the 1977
Amendments.
Errors and imprecision in such complex legislation are not limited to the Clean
Air Act. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976),
for example, has been called "poorly drafted and astonishingly imprecise," as well as
"vague, uncertain and inconsistent." E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541
F.2d 1018, 1026, 1027 (4th Cir. 1976), modified, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
346. Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments, supra note 54, at 201.
347. By early 1981, EPA had unconditionally approved complete revisions of SIPs
for only 5 states. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 16-17. Later that year,
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ical, legislative, administrative, and legal effort has brought little
control over discretion other than through procedural complica-
tion and uncertainty.
One of the leading comments on the Clean Air Act, by Bruce
Ackerman and William Hassler, suggests a way of controlling
agency discretion in the clean air field other than the procedural
complexity adopted by Congress.348 They propose a statute re-
quiring EPA to reach a goal such as-"achieve ambient air quali-
ty improvements that promise to add at least 25,000 years to life
expectancies of the American people by 1984." 349 They argue that
such an approach would give the Agency a goal that is realistically
attainable and the flexibility to promulgate the controls that are
most efficient, yet avoid the bureaucratic drift that prompted the
action-forcing philosophy of the 1970 Act. 350 They, like Jaffe
351
and the authors of the 1970 Act, seek to combine flexibility with
the impetus for effective action that flexibility seems to undercut.
Unlike the 1970 Act and Jaffe, however, their approach empha-
sizes the need for a realistic choice within the actual text of the
statute. But like the 1970 Act and Jaffe, Ackerman and Hassler
put precision in the goals, and not in the rules of conduct, of their
proposed statute.
The advantage of the Ackerman and Hassler approach is that
it would press EPA to focus on the best way to achieve the Act's
goals. 352 The disadvantage is the opportunity for the Agency to
meet the goal on paper rather than in practice. EPA "would find
a way to have its computers declare that its policies save far more"
lives than required.35 3
The decisive virtue in their approach, they argue, is that Con-
gress would have to face the right question-not whether to pro-
tect health, welfare, and other values, but what priority to put on
those goals. 354 Unfortunately, their approach leaves Congress no
way to provide a coherent response. The form of the answer they
suggest would have no more definite meaning than telling EPA to
make the public five percent more pleased with the environment.
The legislature could achieve a more definite meaning if the stat-
ute specified, for instance, that emissions of a particular pollutant
hearings were again held on amendments to the Clean Air Act. See generally Hear-
ings on the Clean Air Act Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
348. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1568-69.
349. Id. at 1568.
350. Id. at 1566-70.
351. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
352. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 9, at 1569.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1569-70.
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were to be reduced by a certain amount. 355 But this would sacri-
fice some of EPA's flexibility and some of the use of agency exper-
tise that are supposed to be advantages of the goals approach. If
Congress is going to be that specific, it should go the whole way
and enact rules of conduct. After all, legislation that specified a
certain reduction in emissions or that required that a certain
number of lives be saved, as Ackerman and Hassler suggest,
would still promise benefits without allocating the costs of compli-
ance. Such legislation leaves the agency without the concrete gui-
dance that both confines and justifies its mandate.
Whether in the form of the Ackerman and Hassler proposal,
the Clean Air Act, or the "broad delegation model," goals statutes
are based on an exaggerated vision of the law's capacity to make
and realize plans. When the mandate for planning is cast nar-
rowly, as in the 1970 Act, the criticism is made that the results are
inefficient and prevent consideration of all the implications.
When the mandate for planning is cast broadly "because there is
no way of integrating so intricate a system the total effect is," ac-
cording to Jaffe, "massively irrational. ' 356 Having clung to the
model of the goals statute approach, but dissatisfied with its re-
sults, we change the mandate, giving discretion and narrowing it,
back and forth.
357
Goals statutes do not, strictly speaking, have to have all of the
faults of the Clean Air Act. One could imagine a goals statute
that gave EPA the power to deal with one part of the air pollution
problem-say acid rain. The statute might provide criteria to
guide EPA's judgment in deciding how much to cut back the
emissions that contribute to acid rain and how to allocate the bur-
den of making the cutbacks among major emitters, but it could
make clear that the decisions would be made ultimately by the
Agency as a matter of policy rather than seeming to be derived
from some formula as under the Clean Air Act. Such a statute
would not incorporate some of the causes of the Clean Air Act's
troubles. Congress would not have imposed impossible complex-
ity, oversold the Act's benefits, or failed to forewarn the public
355. Such an approach has been proposed to deal with acid rain. Senate Panel
Approves Air Act Amendment to Control Acid Rain Through Emissions Cut, 13 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 419 (July 30, 1982). The goal to be legislated is the reduction of sulfur
dioxide emissions from power plants in thirty-one states by eight million tons over
twelve years. The goal is to be converted into controls by negotiations among the
states. If that fails, the proposal contains a formula allocating the required reduction
among the states. Then, within each state, the reductions would have to be allocated
among the sources.
356. Jaffe, supra note 39, at 2.
357. Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1184 ("The current acceptance of the broad delegation
model may be viewed as a point on the metronomic course of dominant thought
about administrative agencies over the past hundred or so years.").
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that EPA would be playing a broad policy role.358 Congress
would, in effect, be facilitating the Agency's task by owning up to
the fact that the legislation was doing fairly little other than au-
thorizing agency action.
The hope for a simpler, more workable goals statute has two
strikes against it. First, Congress does not seem to want to own up
to doing little, as evidenced perhaps by its making the Clean Air
Act more rather than less complicated over the years. Second,
even if Congress were to enact a simpler, less ambitious statute,
the agency would still have to contend with the unresolved contro-
versies that make it hard for agencies to take action.
There is an alternative.
IV. RULES STATUTES FOR AIR POLLUTION
The possibility of legislative rules for air pollution is not a
new idea. Acts and ordinances have forbidden specially bother-
some kinds of emissions for centuries. 359 In recent decades, many
state and local legislatures have enacted air pollution control
rules. 360 Indeed, the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments imposed a
rule limiting emissions from new cars. Nonetheless, there is no
indication that the 1970 Congress considered a rules statute ap-
proach other than for new cars. If the option had arisen, a variety
of objections might have been offered: Congress lacks the exper-
tise and time required; national rules would intrude on state inter-
ests and be inefficient; a legislature cannot react quickly enough to
new information or set controls that force technology; and only
mandatory goals can keep the focus on health and make govern-
358. Some of these virtues might be discerned in the technology-based effluent
requirements for new and existing point sources of water pollution under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(A) (1976). As with the new
source performance standards of the Clean Air Act, supra note 267, the technology-
based provisions of the water legislation require EPA to set emission standards to
reflect not only what industry is doing, but what it could do. But EPA has had to use
the statutory authority "to base standards on general control technologies actually in
use." Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law- A Conceptual Frame-
work, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1300 (1981). Thus the technology-based provisions of
the air and water acts are written as goals statutes, see supra text accompanying note
267, but EPA has, under this broad authority created a rule of its own based upon
technology in use. If that is to be the end result, the legislative and administrative
process would be more forthright if the legislation itself stated the rule. It should be
pointed out as well that Congress in the water legislation did not limit itself to effluent
limits, but as in the air act has also included a variety of provisions calling for ambi-
ent standards, planning on a grand scale, and utopian goals. 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 l(a)(l),
1288, 1312, 1313 (1976).
359. The first smoke abatement law was passed by Edward I in 1273, who prohib-
ited the use of coal as being detrimental to human health. Chass & Feldman, Tears
for John Doe, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 349, 352 (1954).
360. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, A DIGEST
OF STATE AIR POLLUTION LAWS (1967).
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ment accountable to the people. However plausible these argu-
ments against the rules approach may sound, experience indicates
that the goals approach encountered these very difficulties. A rule
could cope with them.
Section A of this Part sets out a possible rules statute ap-
proach to air pollution designed to meet these difficulties ade-
quately, although not ideally. Section B responds to the specific
arguments that a rules statute approach would be contrary to the
public interest. Finally, Section C discusses the advantages a rules
statute approach would have for courts engaged in statutory
interpretation.
A. A Rules Approach to Air Pollution
Legislated air pollution rules would use principally two tools:
emission limits and taxes.361 An emissions limit could take the
form of a limit on emissions per unit of output-for instance, so
many grams of pollutant per thousand BTUs of energy produced
by boilers or, as in the case of the existing Act's limits on new cars,
so many grams emitted per mile driven. A tax could be based, for
example, on a given payment per gram of pollutant emitted.
Emissions limits and taxes could be used in the alternative or in
combination. Emissions limits would be most useful for a large
number of sources presenting similar problems of control such as
new cars or large industrial boilers. A pollutant with sources
presenting disparate control problems might be more easily dealt
with through a tax. The two approaches could be combined:
there could be an emissions limit on industrial boilers which could
be exceeded only by the payment of a tax. Economic approaches
would be less suitable where emissions cause acute health effects.
Under a rules statute approach, Congress would not try to
deal with all risks at once but could enact rules from year to year
as needed. If, for instance, Congress had decided to enact rules in
1970, it might have established rules for new cars, electric generat-
ing stations, and other industrial boilers in that year and then
moved on to other important sources in succeeding years. Under
such a scheme, EPA could have an ongoing role of proposing new
rules for legislative consideration, interpreting and enforcing the
rules enacted, and exercising a power to impose emergency orders
on an interim basis when acute risks are discovered.
362
361. There could also be rules concerning, for instance, activity that indirectly in-
creases emissions. There might also be rules requiring the installation of certain types
of control equipment, rather than limiting emissions as controlled. Or there might be
subsidiary rules requiring the inspection and maintenance of emissions control
equipment.
362. EPA in theory has emergency powers. 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (Supp. IV 1980).
[Vol. 30:740
CLEAN AIR ACT
Such an incremental approach ought not to preempt air pol-
lution control in fora other than Congress. Where Congress has
not established a rule for a type of source, there ought to be no
preemption of federal common law or, of course, of state common
law.363 And even where Congress has established a rule, states
should be free to impose additional restrictions, except perhaps on
new vehicles and vehicle fuel, because tighter state controls gener-
ally would not interfere with federal interests and would allow a
state response to state concerns. The federal legislation could
nonetheless take account of regional differences. A single rule
that may be adequate for much of the country may be thought by
Congress inadequate to protect health in heavily developed areas
or scenic values in places of exceptional natural beauty. Thus,
legislative rules could provide for an especially stringent limit in,
say, the northeastern states.
Congress, however, does not have the time to deal with all
pollution sources or to provide more than gross regional classifica-
tions. Political considerations would tend to focus Congress' at-
tention on the biggest problems with the widest interstate
implications. Particular pressure for national rules would exist
where emissions cause damage across state lines and where states
are unable to regulate local air pollution problems effectively for
fear of losing industry to other states. In the absence of these situ-
ations, however, state or local governments would be better able
to regulate the problems that do not receive federal attention.364
A rules statute approach could also allow for the different cir-
cumstances of different plants. A plant that is to be replaced in a
year or two may not, in the interim, be able to comply with a rule
without extensive capital expenditure. Must it shut down now? A
new plant might use control methods that would be more costly to
put into an existing facility. Congress could deal with such varia-
tions in many ways. 365 For one example, the statute might pro-
vide that a source could exceed the rule if it pays a tax or penalty
based on its excess emissions.366 For another, the statute could
363. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), the Court ruled that the federal
common law of nuisance previously applicable to the dispute, Illinois v. Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91 (1972), was preempted by the subsequent enactment of water pollution
control legislation that purported to be comprehensive. 451 U.S. at 320. Under the
piecemeal approach proposed here, legislation would preempt federal common law
only where there is an applicable rule.
364. The lack of multiple sources of emissions decreases interstate competition.
Fewer sources also mean, in a judicial context, fewer defendants and fewer problems
in proving causation.
365. Possibilities other than those mentioned in the text include an easier rule for
preexisting plants or variances.
366. A large literature has emerged on such market-type approaches to emission
control as pollution taxes and trading in emissions rights. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON, A.
1983]
UCLAI LAW REVIEW
allow a source to produce excess emissions if the source purchases
rights from nearby plants that emit less pollution than allowed.367
Rules cannot offer the precision in result that the goals ap-
proach of the Clean Air Act promises-in dealing with all pollu-
tants, taking account of all geographic differences, or squeezing as
much pollutant reduction as possible out of each plant. Neither
can rules guarantee a given ambient air quality level. More power
plants than expected may be built, for instance. But the promised
precision of the goals approach is spurious and invites evasion and
breakdown.
A rules approach can produce a real solution to a substantial
part of the problem that Congress promised to solve entirely.
Congress knew in 1970 that more than half of the sulfur oxides
come from power generating plants and other large fuel burn-
ers. 368 A few other sources account for most of the rest.369 It is
not unrealistic to think that Congress can make rules for these
sources. Power plants, other large fuel burners, and motor vehi-
cles together account for over eight-tenths of carbon monoxide,
nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, and lead and almost half of the
emission of hydrocarbons and particulate matter.370
KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977); J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES (1968); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1975); Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution. Central Problems, 33 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 227, 233-37 (1968); Comment, Who Owns the Air? The Emission Offset
Concept and Its Implications, 9 ENVTL. L. 575, 586-600 (1979); Comment, Emission-
Offset Banking. Accommodating Industrial Growth with Air Quality Standards, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 937 (1980).
367. Existing law involves trading of emissions rights through three devices: off-
sets, "bubbles," and banking. Drayton, Getting Smarter About Regulation, HARV.
BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1981, at 38. The rationale of these devices is that industry or,
more specifically, the manager on the spot can usually find a more efficient means of
reducing total emissions than could EPA's necessarily generalized regulations. Id.
The trading of emissions rights under a rules statute could be simpler and fairer. A
rules statute might allow a firm to sell so many units of emission rights to a buyer
located within a specified distance to the seller. The impact on air quality would not
need to be computed. Moreover, the availability of units to sell would, under a rules
statute, be based on a firm's ability to reduce emissions below an established level.
Under current law, the availability of saleable emissions is based upon the allocation
of emissions limits made by happenstance in the somewhat ad hoc state plans.
368. Sulfur dioxide emissions from powerplants alone were estimated in 1970 at
twenty million tons out of a total of thirty seven million tons. Air Pollution-1970."
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC
WORKS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HJSTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMEND-
MENTS OF 1970 (pt.2) 1012 (Comm. Print 1974).
369. E.g., smelting of metallic ores (four million tons) and petroleum refinery op-
erations (less than three million tons). Id.
370. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY,
MONITORING, AND EMISSION TRENDS REPORT 5-11 (1978); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR LEAD 1-3 (1977).
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The goals approach purports to deal with all harmful pollu-
tants but falls short; the rules approach would deal with more pol-
lutants than its statute names because the control techniques used
to control one pollutant tend also to reduce emissions of others.
371
B. Objections to a Rules Approach
1. Congress lacks the expertise
Congress is better suited to set controls than an expert
agency. Scientific questions are involved, but Congress could di-
rect EPA to prepare reports and recommendations, and interested
parties would do the same. Expertise takes one only part way to
the decision because the science is full of uncertainty, and, even if
there were certainty, the decisionmaker would have to make value
judgments as to priorities and the allocation of costs. For these
reasons, EPA and the courts have acknowledged that the setting
of standards under the Act is a "legislative-type policy"
decision.3 72
Congress, moreover, does regularly resolve technical conflicts
in legislation. Many statutes now formally allow for legislative
vetoes of decisions requiring expertise.373 Through less formal
procedures, congressional committees review EPA's significant
decisions. 374 Congress has added a number of industry-specific
provisions to the Clean Air Act. 375
But how could Congress come up with rules of conduct if, as
has been suggested,376 no one has the scientific ability to project
accurately from emissions to ambient concentrations? This diffi-
culty is a reason to have the legislature rather than an agency pro-
mulgate controls. The legitimacy of a legislative rule rests not
upon the proven truth of the conclusions reached, but upon the
balancing of interests in a representative process.377 An air pollu-
371. Eg., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PREFERRED STANDARDS
PATH REPORT FOR POLYCYCLIC ORGANIC MATTER xii (1974).
372. Eg., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1977).
373. See, e.g., the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 8724 (Supp. IV 1980). See generally H.R. Doc. No. 416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
753-819 (1974) (partial compilation of legislative vetoes).
374. See, e.g., Clean Air Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pt. 2), 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 83 (1982) (reviewing, in large part, EPA's New Source Performance Standard
for coal-fired powerplants).
375. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (parking); id. § 7411(i) (country
grain elevators); id. § 7419 (nonferrous smelters); id. § 7425 (use of local coal); id.
§ 7521(a)(3) (heavy-duty vehicles); id. § 7545(g) (small refineries); and id.
§§ 7624(a)-7625 (vapor recovery at gas stations).
376. See supra notes 182-194 and accompanying text.
377. Courts are traditionally more deferential to Congress than to administrative
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tion control that is legislated rather than administratively promul-
gated need not be based on particularized air quality objectives.
Thus, the 1977 Congress adopted its rule for new cars through a
process of political tugging and hauling that was in marked con-
trast to the reasoned processes that a court would expect of an
agency. 378 A major advantage of the rules approach is that Con-
gress need not go through the analytical exercises that courts re-
quire of agencies, a requirement that taxes the resources of
agencies, litigants, and judges.
To say that legislative air pollution rules would not be finely
reasoned is not to say that legislating rules would be irrational.
The irrationality resides, rather, in trying to apply a too precise
approach to a field in which the science is rough.
2. Congress lacks the time
Goals statutes are intended to save the legislature's time.
How could Congress handle the volume of decisions that EPA
and the states now promulgate?
The Clean Air Act itself manufactures much of the workload.
It requires EPA and the states to spend most of their time not
setting limits on emissions, but carrying out procedures whose
function is to control discretion.379 The Act also multiplies the
number of decisions that need to be made because limits differ not
just between industries or regions, but between plants in a region
and sometimes between smokestacks in a plant.380 The Act then
re-multiplies the decisions. by the number of steps necessary to im-
plement each control. 38'
The goals approach has also consumed large amounts of
Congress' time. The extensive work of 1969 and 1970 merely sig-
nalled the beginning of ongoing congressional consideration of air
pollution issues. Major legislative activity took place in 1974,
agencies. Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
258-59 (1964) ("whether Congress had a rational basis" for its findings, and whether
the means chosen are "reasonable and appropriate"), with Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (agency's actions can not be "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
378. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
seems to anticipate an elaborately reasoned cost-benefit approach by the agency.
379. The control of discretion is the aim of the entire process for ambient pollu-
tants from listing to the approval of state plans, including the setting of health and
welfare standards, air quality monitoring, emissions inventories, and modeling to pre-
dict air quality, all with great elaboration. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1062-64,
1076-77, 1082-83.
380. See supra text accompanying note 189.
381. The proposals are subjected to hearing at the state level, adoption at the state
level, federal rule making proposal, and federal adoption. The controls may then be
subject to requests for plan revisions. See generally Pedersen, supra note 57.
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1976, 1977, 1981, and 1982, with basic issues still far from
resolution.3
8 2
Congress would not have the time to enact rules to cover all
of the risks, given the many types of pollutants and many types of
sources. Nevertheless, those issues, if made the subject of rules,
would be decided, not relegated to a long-term administrative
process that might never reach resolution. The case of hazardous
pollutants reflects problems and strengths inherent in both the
rules and goals approach. Despite current law, many of these pol-
lutants remain unregulated. The large number of these pollutants
makes their regulation seem like a project more suitable for an
agency than a legislature. On the other hand, uncertainty about
the costs and benefits of controlling them, as well as the lack of a
means to state a standard to guide an agency's trade-offs, would
suggest that regulation of hazardous pollutants is probably more
amenable to political than administrative decision. Under a rules
statute approach, the legislature could minimize its workload by
establishing emissions limits for categories of pollutants rather
than individual pollutants. Or, it might specify types of control
equipment for some industries rather than regulate specific pollu-
tants. Congress would probably leave to state action the large
number of pollutants that come from a small number of sources
and have primarily intrastate effects.
It may be argued that it is futile to rely on the states to protect
health or other environmental values and that national decisions
reflect greater concern for these values.38 3 Yet the seeming munif-
icence of national decisions may result not so much from being
made at the national level, but from Congress making promises
rather than implementing them. The clean air experience reflects
a definite waning of environmental enthusiasm at the national
level when the job turns from promising to acting.
384
382. The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246, amended the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1977 involved particularly intensive consideration in 1976 and 1977, as evi-
denced by eighty-five days of markup in the House alone, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 94,
95 (May 28, 1982), and by a seven volume reprint of the condensed legislative history.
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY ON THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977 (Comm. Print
1978). Similarly intensive legislative activity has taken place in 1981 and 1982. See,
e.g., Clean Air Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1982); Clean Air
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy Development And Applications and the
Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research and Environment of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
383. The 1970 Act suggests distrust of the states. See supra text accompanying
note 146.
384. This loss of enthusiasm may even result in a congressional reversal of policy.
For example, Congess, in promising to rid the nation of air pollution, mandated
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3. National rules would violate principles of federalism
The 1970 Act, like its predecessors, stated that "the preven-
tion and control of air pollution at its source is the primary re-
sponsibility of States and local government. '385 The 1970 Act in
particular conceives of establishing controls to achieve those goals
as a state and local task. Under this view, national rules would
invade the domain of state and local government. In practice,
however, the 1970 Act failed to meet national objectives and in-
truded upon state and local government.
The most obvious reasons for national air legislation are the
interstate flow of air pollution 386 and the interstate competition for
jobs.3 87 In fact, however, EPA has been relatively impotent in
preventing states from trading health risks for economic advan-
tage and has avoided ruling on interstate flows of air pollution.
388
Though it failed to solve these national problems, the Act at least
appeared to "commandeer" state police power for nationally or-
dained goals. 389 Even before NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery390
used the tenth amendment for the first time to strike down Con-
gress' application of its commerce power to the states, most courts
of appeal had held that EPA lacked the power to order states to
regulate to meet national objectives by interpreting the statute to
avoid possible constitutional problems. 39' After National League
of Cities, the question of EPA's power to order the states was
avoided by: (1) EPA withdrawing certain regulations in a success-
ful attempt to moot cases in which the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari;392 (2) Congress in 1977 giving EPA leverage
over the states by threatening to punish uncooperative states
transportation control plans, supra text accompanying notes 172-174, and indirect
land use controls, (requiring approval for construction of facilities likely to draw
heavy traffic, e.g., shopping centers and sports arenas). When EPA was required,
statutorily or judicially, to implement these politically infeasible programs, Congress
pressured EPA to limit or delay transportation control plans, burying proposed na-
tional land use legislation. J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 201-12.
385. 1970 Act § 101(a)(3) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (Supp. IV
1980)).
386. See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir. 1974); 42
U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
387. "[M]inimum Federal standards are a must, as they free the 50 states from the
necessity of competing for business by lowering their standards." 116 CONG. REC.
33,115 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Prouty). See also id. at 32,902 (remarks of Sen. Mus-
kie), id. 32,907 (remarks of Sen. Boggs incorporating message from Pres. Nixon), and
id. 32,922 (remarks of Sen. Dole).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 181-192, 311-314.
389. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 987-88 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated,
431 U.S. 99 (1977).
390. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
391. See supra note 151.
392. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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through withholding grants and forbidding construction of new
plants;393 and (3) EPA largely avoiding use of these threatened
powers.
394
Congress declared the good news through clean air goals, but
left the states to declare the bad through imposition of controls.
Thus, the Act was neither a fair basis for a federal partnership nor
a division of power making each level of government accountable
for the chief consequences of its actions. The 1970 Act was a par-
ody of federalism.
A rules approach would provide a better division of national
and state responsibilities. National legislators would be more ac-
countable for the costs of the benefits they promised, and state
officials could take credit for initiatives to deal with state
problems. National rules would concentrate on industries where
interstate competition and interstate air flows are a substantial
problem, leaving states free to impose additional controls and deal
with additional types of sources without having to submit to fed-
eral procedures. 395
4. Legislated rules would be inefficient
One apparent advantage of a goals statute is efficiency. Com-
pare, for instance, a rule that imposes the same limit on emissions
rates from all plants in an industry with a regime that imposes the
most stringent controls on the plants that can reduce emissions at
the lowest cost. The latter scheme could achieve the same reduc-
tion in overall emissions at a lower cost than the former, at least if
only the costs of compliance are taken into account. Since dele-
gated authority can craft its controls on a more case-specific basis
than can Congress, it would seem that a goals approach would be
more efficient. Indeed, the sponsors of the 1970 Act said that state
plans should be the primary implementation vehicle partly be-
393. See supra notes 201-204 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 205-213 and accompanying text.
395. Either a rules statute or a goals statute approach encounters a special prob-
lem when state or local government can more conveniently implement a control. For
instance, vehicle emissions inspection, which preserves the benefit of emissions con-
trol devices, is probably best carried out through state safety inspections and licensing
instead of through the establishment of a parallel federal procedure in order to mini-
mize inconvenience to motorists and to avoid duplication of governmental effort. The
1977 Amendments in essence imposed a rule upon certain states to implement an
emission inspection program. 1977 Act § 172(b)( 11)(B) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502(b)( 11)(B) (Supp. IV 1980)). A rules statute approach could try the same tack
as the 1977 Amendments or else, to avoid constitutional doubts, forbid the state to
register any car that was not inspected by either a federal or a state facility. See
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The hope in the
latter instance would be that states would, for the convenience of their motorists, es-
tablish emission inspections facilities as part of their safety inspections rather than
make motorists go to federal facilities.
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cause state officials could choose the controls most suitable to the
local situation.
396
This efficiency argument for the superiority of goals statutes
overlooks three factors. 397 First, rules statutes can take the form
of emission taxes and can allow the trading of emission rights
among sources subject to emission limits. Both approaches allow
private parties to take into account differences between sources in
the costs of control. Second, an administrative scheme selecting
controls on a case-by-case basis may well pick a less efficient ar-
rangement than would private firms trading emission rights.
Third, the adminstration of the process to impose case-specific
controls will impose costs of its own in terms of the resources de-
voted to bureaucratic procedures and to litigation, delay, and
uncertainty.
EPA, in fact, has allowed the use of various schemes to trade
emissions rights among private parties, subject to administrative
approval, rather than relying solely on the administrative alloca-
tion of controls.39 The Act, however, makes such trading cum-
bersome.3 99 It may well be that, taking all costs into account, a
rules statute providing for emission penalties or allowing trading
of emissions rights would be more efficient than a goals approach.
5. Legislation responds too slowly to new information
A supposed advantage of delegation is that delegated author-
ities can respond more quickly than Congress to significant new
information. Practice under the Clean Air Act, however, has
proved far different than theory.
Suppose there were a significant new discovery about a pollu-
tant suggesting that it is much less or much more dangerous than
previously thought. Congress might take a year or two to develop
and enact a change in the applicable national rule. Under the
396. See supra text accompanying note 128.
397. The hypothetical does not exhaust the ways in which a goals statute could
theoretically produce more efficient results. If the goal is to reduce emissions of a
certain pollutant rather than its emissions from a particular industry, a goals statute
could allow an agency to vary the emissions limits not just between plants but be-
tween industries to reach a more efficient result. Or, if the goal is to reduce the impact
on health from pollution rather than just the one pollutant previously in question, an
agency could look to sources of various pollutants. Or, if the goal is to protect health
from any danger rather than just from pollution, still a wider and theoretically more
efficient range of choices would present themselves. Yet, each enlargement of the
definition of the problem increases not only the opportunities for efficiencies but also
the transaction costs and the possibilities for mistakes in allocation.
398. See supra note 367.
399. Pedersen, supra note 57, at 1103-04. Pedersen proposes changes to ease mar-




Clean Air Act, however, the same information would require a
rule-making procedure to change the applicable national ambient
air quality standards, state proceedings to adjust the applicable
state plans, and then federal approval or disapproval of each state
plan revision.400 Even if judicial review of ambient air standards
and state plans did not slow down the administrative process, the
entire process would take several years and probably far more.
40 1
The administrative process can react far more quickly than a
legislature to narrower questions, such as those regarding control
of a single source. Particularized controls, however, are a feature
of the goals approach while a rules statute would contain general
standards. Questions about a particular application of such gen-
eral standards could be handled in the enforcement process.
6. A legislature cannot force technology
Government regulation of private industry emissions was
problematical for the authors of the 1970 Act. Industry has the
most direct information about what emission reductions are feasi-
ble. If government regulations were based upon the information
that industry wants to provide, however, the regulations would
not encourage technological innovation. How then can Congress
enact rules to prompt technological innovation?40 2
The 1970 Act presented mandatory goals as the way to press
industry to develop better emissions control technology. Govern-
ment would avoid trying to figure out what industry could do
thorough research and development by taking the position that
sources must find a way to comply or shut down. While this
threat may have motivated some innovation, the Act, as already
noted,40 3 also gave firms reasons not to spend money developing
improved means of emissions control: they would then have to
spend more money to install and operate what they had invented.
This made the hope of innovation critically dependent on the
credibility of the threat to shut down violators. But few sources
were shut down.404 Claims about feasibility were made and relief
often granted by the states in drafting their plans,40 5 by EPA in
400. See 1970 Act §§ 109(b)(l), l0(a)(2)(H) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7409(b)(1), 7410(a)(2)(H) (Supp. IV 1980)).
401. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 14.
402. Henderson and Pearson note that the authorities are sometimes led to give
aspirational commands for lack of the information needed to be specific about what
an industry should do. Henderson & Pearson, supra note 54, at 1441. But, when
Congress seeks to cope with the problem of the industry having the necessary infor-
mation by delegating authority to an agency to promulgate "non-aspirational rules of
conduct," the agency often finds itself in the same fix as Congress. Id. at 1438.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 157-158.
404. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 267.
405. See supra § II(C)(2).
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approving state plans,40 6 by the states and EPA in the enforcement
process, 40 7 and by Congress in both industry-specific relief 40 and
the overall extension of deadlines. 40 9 So governmental entities
ended up having to make the kind of decisions about feasibility
that Congress said they had to avoid in the first place.
The rules approach offers a less dramatic but probably more
effective means to stimulate innovations in pollution control.
Rules of conduct could be set in advance of what industry can do,
and allow deviation from the rules through either taxes on excess
emissions or trade-offs between firms.410 This approach would
create cash incentives to develop better technology and would re-
quire no particularized governmental findings about what firms
could or could not achieve.
7. Mandatory goals are needed to protect health
Despite the inevitability of trade-offs between health and
other interests, it might be argued that mandatory air quality goals
give environmental interests a tactical advantage. While an air
quality goal is set in a single national proceeding focused on
health, national emissions rules for dozens of industries might di-
vide the attention of the public and shift some of the focus to the
industries' economics.
Goals, of course, help to avoid getting side-tracked. Indeed,
long before 1970, federal statutes provided for "air quality crite-
ria."'41' These criteria, combined with growing environmental con-
cern in the late 1960s, resulted in significant efforts by some state
and local governments to impose emission rules that challenged
the technical capacities of economically important industries. 412
The 1970 Act turned the essentially advisory goals of the past into
mandatory duties. This might seem effective because, in one fell
swoop, Congress wrote environmental goals into law without hav-
406. See supra § II(C)(3).
407. EPA may postpone compliance deadlines and states may grant variances al-
lowing noncompliance, depending on, among other things, feasibility. See Currie,
Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation, supra note 54, at 380-90;
Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, supra note 54, at 155-176.
408. See supra note 374.
409. See supra § II(C)(4).
410. Stewart, supra note 274, at 1326-37, finds that "Emission or Noncompliance
Fees or Taxes" as well as "Transferable Pollution or Other Nonperformance Rights"
would be superior to "Command-and-Control regulation" in stimulating new pollu-
tion control technology. Stewart raises and deals with possible problems in designing
and implementing such market incentive approaches.
411. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206 § 3(c)(2), 77 Stat. 392, 395 (1963).
412. See, e.g., New York City Air Pollution Control Code, Local Law 1971, No.
49 (current version at NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER AND CODE ch. 57, pt. 11 (1975)).
See supra note 20.
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ing to deal with assorted economic, social, and technical counter-
arguments. Nevertheless, the Clear Air Act began with a legal
mandate for environmental utopia and then was adjusted to real-
ity through a variety of exceptions, legislative and administrative,
formal and informal, legal and convenient.
The tactical advantage of mandatory goals is illusory. Far
from concentrating the decision into a single simple national pro-
ceeding, or even several dozen, the goals approach divides it into
thousands of separate proceedings. Functionally, each source is
the possible subject of an inquiry, in the course of an enforcement
process, into the cost and benefits of making that source take cer-
tain compliance action.41 3 Sources can dramatize the cost of con-
trol to them and their employees. EPA cannot show that a
particular pollutant causes a given quantity of death and disease,
let alone show that decreasing emissions at a particular plant will
produce a particular benefit.
A rules approach would be clearer and easier. Legislated
rules are not expected to be backed up with specific facts or justi-
fied in every instance of their application. It is enough that they
press in the right direction. The goals approach, far from giving
environmental interests a tactical advantage, creates extra burdens
and obstructions.
8. Action-forcing procedures make government more
accountable
Action-forcing procedures in theory make government more
accountable because the states and EPA have a duty to meet clean
air goals. Citizens can ensure that duty is properly fulfilled
through citizens' suits, judicial review, and participation in public
hearings on state plans. In fact, however, action-forcing undercuts
accountability.
The action-forcing procedures implied that Congress .had
finished its work and that EPA and the states could do the rest of
the job. It thus shunted public expectations away from a directly
accountable, visible forum. The hope that public participation at
the hearings on the implementation plans would be politically de-
cisive proved ephemeral. In regard to public participation, Sena-
tor Muskie said in 1970 that "[t]hese plans do not involve
technical decisions; they do involve public policy choices that citi-
413. Decisions about how to allocate the burden of meeting ambient air standards
in state implementation plans and their revisions are meant to take account of compli-
ance costs. See supra text accompanying note 128. Costs and benefits are also taken
into account in more formal ways. Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, supra note 54, at 163-65; see also 1977 Act
§ 172(b)(1 1)(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 750(b)( 11)(A) (Supp. IV 1980)).
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zens should make on the State and local level. ' 414 But, in prac-
tice, the hearings often pivoted upon esoteric questions, and
effective participation requires more money and expertise than is
usually available to public groups. 41 5 The National Commission
found, for this reason, that private industry has more impact on
the implementation plan process than do public interest groups.41 6
The states and EPA were still subject to citizen suits for fail-
ure to carry out mandatory duties, and EPA was subject to judi-
cial review for acting contrary to statute. It was often possible,
however, to make duties seem fulfilled through factual assertions
that, given judicial deference to agency expertise, are difficult to
challenge in court.417
C. Rules Statutes Would Extricate Courts from Inappropriate
Roles
Despite the inadequacies of the 1970 Act, there were still
many successful suits against EPA, the states, and pollutors. In
these cases, the courts and private litigants made public policy.
The courts said they were not making policy, but only ensuring
that the will of Congress was fulfilled. The job of the courts, it was
said, was to determine what was legal rather than what was rea-
sonable.41 8 Yet, where legislative language and history are debat-
able, the reasonableness arguments are hard to segregate from
questions of statutory interpretation, and the courts are drawn to-
wards a policy-making role. The cases requiring EPA to imple-
ment a nondegradation policy,4 19 and reversing the agency's
denial of a postponement of emissions controls on new cars,420
illustrate judicial policymaking under the Act. Even if the courts
414. 116 CONG. REC. 42,382 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
415. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 14, 103-04.
416. Id. at 104.
417. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 189.
418. Eg., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
194-95 (1978).
In one case, Justice Powell voted for a result he viewed as unreasonable because
the statutory requirements were demonstrated "irrefutably," even though he believed
"that Congress, if fully aware of this Draconian possibility, would strike a different
balance." Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 272 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
419. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 4 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v.
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). See Currie, FederalAir Quality Standards and Their
Implementation, supra note 54, at 374-75 (1976); Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation
Policy in Congress and the Courts" The Erratic Pursuit of Clear Air and Clean Water,
62 IowA L. REV. 643, 664-68 (1977).
420. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
discussed supra note 274. See also Stewart, The Development of Administrative and
Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking Les-
sonsfrom the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REV. 713, 732-34 (1977); Wright, The Courts
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might be faulted for exceeding a judicial role in those cases, there
are many instances under such a baroque statute when the courts
cannot avoid policymaking because of the frequency of intention-
ally contradictory language or sloppy drafting.
42'
Even when the statutory language is clear, courts must often
make policy in formulating remedies. Proponents of the citizen
suit provision argued that enforcement would not strain the judi-
ciary and make courts into organs of policy because it would be
simple to compare clear-cut statutory duties with what had been
done and, if necessary, to order compliance.422 This argument
would be true in a case where a plant is violating a numerical
emissions limit whose violation can be remedied without delay or
loss of jobs. But many of the remedy problems under the Clean
Air Act and similar legislation put the courts in the midst of far-
reaching policy questions. The consequences of ordering a pol-
luter to comply or shut down may have to be considered.
423
Action-forcing statutes put a particular responsibility on the
judge because the statutory duties imposed tend to be unleavened
by the compromise ordinarily embedded in a legislated rule of
conduct. The court may thus face an impossible task. Judge Ger-
hard Gesell, for instance, faced a situation under a statute similar
to the Clean Air Act where EPA had violated its duty to issue
critical regulations by a deadline and still could not comply with
reasonable promptitude without using resources needed to comply
with other duties and court orders under a whole array of action-
forcing statutes. 424 Judge Gesell stated from the bench:
Well-meaning statutes are not self-implementing.
If the Court could do anything about it, the Court would;
but these are not matters within the reach of the chancellor's
foot. There is little a court of equity can do.
These are matters of national policy, political priorities;
and I would urge upon the parties with everything at my com-
mand, that they consider the appropriateness of continuing to
rely on courts to accomplish objectives which can only be effec-
and the Rulemaking Process.- The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375,
381-83 (1974).
421. The Act's lack of clarity is a recurring theme of Prof. Currie's writing. Cur-
ie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments,
supra note 54, at 158-86. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 61, at 149
(PSD provisions "ambiguous and sometimes contradictory"); Ackerman & Hassler,
supra note 9, at 1488 (amendment to § 11l "hopelessly incoherent mix of statutory
language and legislative history"). See also supra note 345.
422. 1970 Senate Report, supra note 13, at 36-38; 116 CONG. REC. 33,103 (1970)
(remarks of Sen. Muskie).
423. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982).
424. See Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597 (D.D.C. 1979), arf'd sub
nom. Citizens for a Better Env't v. Costle, 617 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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tively accomplished in a democracy by resort to the polls, resort
to the political processes which the Constitution preserves.
There is little I can do. I have done the most I can. But
there are other forums where these issues could be far more
properly and effectively ventilated.
425
The action-forcing statutes nonetheless mandate that the judge
craft a remedy.426
Public interest groups also play a role in deciding to which of
its many absolute duties EPA should devote its insufficient re-
sources. This role is exercised in decisions as to which potential
suits to pursue and which remedies to propose. Public interest
groups, as such, exercise a type of private prosecutorial discretion.
The irony of the action-forcing structure as a means to in-
crease accountability is that the President and Congress, the most
directly accountable actors, get off the hook, as they did in 1970,
by mandating goals without facing the costs. The federal agency
and the states maintain much of the discretion that they would
have exercised under the broad delegation model, and considera-
ble discretionary power devolved upon two types of organizations
that are unaccountable as policymakers-the courts and public in-
terest groups.
Broad delegation statutes would lessen the power of private
litigants but make it hard for courts to hold agencies accountable
to the spirit of the statute without the courts themselves dabbling
in the policy work consigned to the agency.427 Action-forcing stat-
utes, such as the Clean Air Act, entail complexities that facilitate
their weakening through language changes that are "seemingly in-
nocuous. ' '428 Severing goals from controls vitiates accountability
within the legislative process.
V. SOME PERSPECTIVES AND RAMIFICATIONS
For purposiveness means that we are more concerned with
the remote future results of our actions than with their own quality
or their immediate effects on our own environment. The "ourpo-
sive" man is always trying to secure a spurious and delusive im-
mortalityfor his acts bypushing his interest in them forward into
time. He does not love his cat, but his cat's kittens,- nor, in truth,
the kittens, but only the kittens'kittens, and so onforwardfor ever




426. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
427. See generally Stewart, supra note 60, at 1781-89.
428. D. Costle, supra note 20, at 12.




A. Rules Statutes Are a Better Approach to Air Pollution
Goals statutes do not end the need to make difficult decisions,
but allocate decision-making authority to entities that usually
have less legitimacy than Congress to make value judgments stick.
It might be said in Congress' defense, however, that it wisely let
others wrestle with the controversy first in order to "get the ball
rolling" and develop understanding through experience. But the
major experience that a goals statute engenders in its first year or
two is procedural and abstract. Several years passed before the
costs of the 1970 Act began to take concrete form in the imple-
mentation of controls, and it was not until 1977 that Congress ac-
ted on the subject again in a comprehensive way. The 1970 Act
was passed at the height of the public concern necessary to over-
come special pleadings and reach an answer.430 The special op-
portunity that Senator Muskie perceived in 1970 to focus public
attention on the problem431 was thereafter dissipated. This atten-
tion could have been better invested in an act that set some rules
of conduct whose execution in the near term might have helped to
mature public opinion through concrete experience.
The approach taken by the 1970 Act infantilized rather than
matured public opinion. It legitimized the conflict in expectations
that "health" would be protected, degradation of air quality
avoided, and the basic economic needs of the country met. The
Act riled passions against "polluters" or, as Ralph Nader called
them (or us), "smoggers. '' 432 It set the stage for future disappoint-
ment, recrimination, and demagoguery. Even now, after over a
decade of experience with the Act, a recent poll of public opinion
on air pollution shows that 65% of those sampled believe that the
government should protect health at any cost.433
The country has paid a heavy price for indulging immaturity
in statutory form. The conflict between clean air concerns and the
inevitability of emissions that Congress failed to resolve had to be
430. Senator Muskie said during Clean Air Act hearings in early 1970:
[F]or the first time in 7 or 8 years there is a tremendous reservoir of
public concern and support for effective action in this field. I think our
primary challenge is to use that resource in developing the soundest and
most effective legislation of which we are capable.
Air Pollution-1970, Part I.- Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Comm on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30 (1970).
43 1. See supra note 430.
432. Nader, supra note 27, at viii.
433. Harris Survey Finds 80 Percent of Public in Opposition to Relaxing Air Regula-
tion, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 789, 790 (Oct. 23, 1981).
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addressed by numerous other official institutions and private play-
ers that lacked Congress' authority to resolve public disputes. The
Act dictated that resources which might have gone to solve sub-
stantive problems go into procedures that required filling in the
blanks in a big intellectual machine.
The consequences of the procedural complication wrought by
the Act were worse than additive. Reducing emissions from a
given source requires many procedural stages, each of which
might change from time to time. Success in enforcement often
requires keeping all of these ducks in a row. Building a new
source presents similar problems. 434 Under the goals design of the
statute, sources must seek permission for what they intend to do,
while under a rules approach, certain conduct would be forbidden
and the rest allowed. Since there are a number of statutes requir-
ing permissions, a builder must go through a long, difficult process
to get a consistent set of permits for a project.435 In contrast, a
builder in a world of rules statutes has the simpler task of design-
ing or locating the project to avoid the prohibitions. Goals stat-
utes are not progressive, but reactionary against both pollution
control and economic innovation.
Can it be held that the adverse aspects of the Act's design are
justified by its strong support of the clean air goal, that the ends
justify the means? It might be argued, after all, that it was the
1970 Act that first made clean air an important national priority.
To the contrary-what made clean air a priority was the public
support for its protection. The threat that officials and industry
felt from growing citizen concern about air pollution was vented
into complicated, prolonged procedures that dissipated the push
for effective federal and state legislation and preempted or dis-
couraged judicial action. Industry has supported other compli-
cated environmental goals statutes since 1970436 and sought to use
the pendency of federal procedures as a shield against more direct
434. See, e.g., Orloff, Rethinking Environmental Law, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981,
at F3.
435. Stewart, supra note 274, at 1272, suggests that overlapping "command and
control" requirements do not often create irresolvable conflicts for innovators, but
present the "more serious danger" of "imposing burdens, that while individually tol-
erable, create severe costs, constraints, delays, or uncertainty." See also supra note
363.
436. There was some industry support for the Toxic Substances Control Act. See,
e.g., Markup of Toxic Substances Bill Starts in House Commerce Committee, 7 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 196, 196-97 (June 4, 1976); Chemical Company Announces Support of
Toxic Substances Control Measure, 5 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1730, 1730-31 (Mar. 7,
1975). But see, e.g., AFL-CIO Official Urges Strengthening of S1776 To Enhance
Safety of Workers, 5 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1991, 1992 (Apr. 18, 1975); Proposed Toxic
Substances Bill Opposed by Dow Chemical Company, 5 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1954, 1954
(Apr. 11, 1975). In practice, that act has been too cumbersome to be effective.
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regulation.4 37 The Act's complexity has also tarred the efforts for
cleaner air because of the bureaucratic intricacy inherent in its
approach.
The Act, moreover, only appeared to shift power from pol-
luters to breathers. Both polluters and breathers yielded air rights
to government. There has been a long tradition of private rights
in the use of the air for both emitting and breathing and for public
rights in the air.438 The 1970 Clean Air Act operates to eliminate
private rights as if the air is literally only the "Nation's air. '439
The Clean Air Act gives government the power to decide the al-
lowable quantity of emissions and who is permitted to make them.
As Richard Stewart has said of the 1970 Act, "one's liability to
regulation becomes a function not of ordered rules but of an-
other's will." 440 The discretion that the 1970 Act theoretically
gave to the EPA Administrator is comparable to the discretion
that would be given under the tax laws if the Internal Revenue
Commissioner were told to raise a sum of money "sufficient to
meet federal needs with an adequate margin of safety" without
prescribing the rates and categories of taxation.
Some commentators suggest that problems I blame on the
goals structure of air pollution legislation--delay, uncertainty,
and protracted litigation-are caused by the litigation process it-
self and by environmentalists and industries too prone to be litig-
ious and stiff-necked. These commentators have garnered
substantial support and spawned a number of groups committed
to "alternative means of dispute resolution" to promote compro-
mise for environmental and related conflicts.44' In support of the
hypothesis that the problem is more in the legislation than in the
437. For example, the railroad industry sued EPA to be made subject to addi-
tional noise regulation to take advantage of the preemption features of the federal
noise legislation. Association of Am. RRs. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
438. See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611) (plaintiff Al-
dred awarded damages when defendant built a pigsty next to Aldred's house, fouling
the air).
439. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
440. Stewart, Paradoxes of Liberty, Integrity and Fraternity.- The Collective Nature
of Environmental Quality and Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 7 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 463, 472 (1977).
441. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS (L.
Lake ed. 1980); S. MERNITZ, MEDIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES, A
SOURCEBOOK (1980); Fanning, The World's Newest Profession, ENVIRONMENT, Sept.
1979, at 33; Straus, Mediating Environmental, Energy and Economic Trade-offs, ARB.
J., June 1977, at 96; T. Gladwin, Environmental Mediation and a Contingency The-
ory of Preferred Third Party Intervention (Mar. 1982) (Paper No. 81-13, New York
University Graduate School of Business Administration, on file at UCLA Law Re-
view).
In further research, I hope to explore the question of whether the avoidance or




mindsets of environmental organizations or industry, I offer the
following points. First, the primary method of dispute resolution
(to which the "alternative" forms are alternative) is the legislative
rather than the judicial process. In the clean air area at least, the
legislative form of dispute resolution has evaded the issues and
left them to institutions with less capacity to deal with contro-
versy. Second, the clean air legislation is stated in such abstract
terms that if environmentalists do not take principled and there-
fore seemingly stiff-necked postions, it is hard to see what protec-
tion they are left with under the legislation. Third, the statutes
have legitimized conflicting expectations on all sides. Finally, by
giving any citizen a right to sue to achieve theoretically absolute
goals, it is difficult to bring into one room all of the actors needed
to settle a controversy with finality.
B. Are Rules Statutes a Better Approach to Issues Other Than
Air Pollution?
The reasons that goals statutes cause trouble in dealing with
air pollution are not peculiar to goals statutes in that field.4
42 I
hope that persons with interests in other fields will consider the
wider applicability of a rules statute approach.
Whether rules statutes ought to be the usual approach of the
legislative process to the regulation of the private sector in peace-
time is a question beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless,
several observations may be useful to clear away some misconcep-
tions about rules statutes. First, legislation in many important
areas employs statutes that are clearly in the rules mold. When
Congress wants to be precise, it can be. The federal income tax,"43
the windfall profits tax,4 4 the National Gas Policy Act of 1978,4 5
and the control of emission from new cars are some examples.
Second, rules statutes need not be lengthy or absolutely pre-
cise. Recall that the talisman of a rules statute is not ironclad cer-
tainty but an extrinsic standard whose application may require
interpretation. It may well be that, as broad delegation came to be
more acceptable, courts and agencies have come to treat what had
442. One reason that goals statutes do not work well in the air pollution field may
seem restricted to that area-the uncertainty of the scientific information linking
health effects to ambient concentrations and ambient concentrations to emissions.
Such uncertainty is pervasive in the environmental and public health field. Programs
to allocate supplies and control prices in the economic field also encounter uncer-
tainty concerning the relationship between price and supply or demand, for example.
And beyond matters of pollution and economics, there are many areas where quanti-
fication is not even ordinarily used.
443. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1564 (1976).
444. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998 (Supp. V 1981).
445. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. V 1981).
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previously been open-textured rules statutes as goals statutes.446
Rules statutes, in short, are not oddities, but indeed are prevalent.
Third, areas that have been governed by goals statutes may,
after all, be susceptible to treatment through rules statutes. Air
pollution was a prime example of the supposed need for a goals
statute approach. In addition, prominent proposals for improve-
ments in regulation would also happen to make a rules approach
more feasible. 447
Fourth, a problem that is not susceptible to treatment in a
rules statute may be a reflection not on the legislature's capacity to
enact rules, but on society's capacity to cope with the problem in
the way that it desires. A propensity to approach problems
through rules statutes may help face up to societal vanities before
expectations are raised by vain statutes.
It may be useful to think about the use of rules statutes in
generic terms, as well as issue-by-issue, because a variety of ge-
neric solutions have been proposed to meet complaints that regu-
lation generally costs too much to implement and administer.
Some proposals are: (1) regulatory budgets to limit costs that fed-
eral agencies can impose on the private sector;44 8 (2) Congres-
sional vetoes;449 (3) Presidential oversight of agency decisions; 450
and (4) the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 451 which requires agencies
to prepare a formal analysis of the red tape that would be gener-
ated by proposed regulations. These approaches may, however,
be part of the problem rather than the cure. One problem with
goals statutes is that the enactor gets to take credit for the goal
without having to accept responsibility for the costs of compliance
and administration. The proposed reforms can be seen as new
446. See supra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
447. Breyer suggested, for example, using taxes rather than price controls and al-
locations to deal with windfall profits in certain circumstances. Breyer, Analyzing
Regulatory Failure" Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternative, and Reform, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 549, 590-95 (1979). See also ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY,
FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM ch. 4 (1979).
448. Ross, Time to Regulate the Regulators--and Place the Blame on Congress,
Nat'l L.J., May 12, 1980, at 24, col. I, at 25, col. 1. For a thoughtful analysis of the
place of regulatory budgets, see Stewart, supra note 274, at 1361-64.
449. See supra note 373.
450. ABA COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 447, at 73-88.
451. The recently-enacted Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (Supp.
V 1981), requires agencies to prepare, for each proposed and final rulemaking, a
"regulatory flexibility analysis," describing the impact of the rules on small busi-
nesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions. Id. §§ 603-604. Agencies must
also periodically review all of their rules having "a significant economic impact upon
a substantial number of small entities." Id. § 610. The stated purpose for all this
analyzing and reviewing is to minimize the regulatory and informational burden on
such entities. Id. § 601 app.
19831
UCLA LAW REVIEW
goals schemes with the goal being, this time, to reduce the costs of
regulation. They will engender their own costs of complication.
There is, in a sense, an upward spiral of complication that
began with the discretionary regulation of the "broad delegation"
model. This regulatory power was regulated through action-forc-
ing procedures to avoid agency inaction resulting from too much
discretion. This regulation was in turn regulated in statutes like
the 1977 Amendments to avoid the supposed impossibility of the
action-forcing procedures. Now there are proposals to regulate
this regulation to simplify the complexity that has been created.
The proposals for simplification will, when enacted, most likely
create even deeper complication.452
C. Will Congress Enact Rules Statutes?
With the 1970 Act, Congress served its own political needs
and enhanced its own power. It was a master stroke. At a time of
growing distrust of government, Congress was on the defensive for
failing to protect people from air pollution. Any rules legislated
would bring simultaneous charges of allowing too much pollution
and costing too much. By declaring itself capable of satisfying all
concerns, Congress transformed itself from a caterpillar of gov-
ernment into a butterfly of the people. The Act allowed legislators
to be everything to everybody.
First, one could be a national hero by purporting to protect
health forever. Who could object without being a kill-joy?453 Sec-
ond, when the consequences of the law became clear, and the need
to incur costs and stop activities in order to comply became appar-
ent, one could then play hero at home by opposing the application
of the Act in the local context. Next, as industry and governors
came to Washington for relief, and as environmentalists com-
plained that EPA was not doing enough, one could play statesman
and dole out compromises requiring EPA to go through new pro-
cedures and write new reports. The same politician could play all
roles, protector of nature in national forums and savior of the lo-
cal economy at home.454
452. See Amendment Proposals Would Make Air Act More Difficult to Carry Out,
Barber Says, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 54 (May 21, 1982).
453. According to Senator Muskie, this was not a "political measure," insinuating
that any opposition would derive from political or economic greed based upon "false
implication." 116 CONG. REC. 42,383 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
454. Compare Sen. Eagleton's statement that economic impact was not a factor
under the Act, J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 83, and criticism of alleged OMB inter-
ference with EPA proposed regulations after the public comment period, id. at 87,
with his intervention, after the public comment period, in the case of a proposed rule
imposing economic costs on an industry in his home state. Joint Appendix, at
2717-21, Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980). (I appeared in a
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In fairness to Congress, it must'be noted that the electorate
wanted or at least accepted legislation that promised an ideal, al-
beit unrealistic solution. Political scientists have noted the ten-
dency of legislatures to treat issues requiring trade-offs by
generating schemes, however implausible, that make it seem that
everybody will be better off.455 If the 1970 Congress had been
unwilling to pass a demagogic4 56 piece of clean air legislation,
then the public may well have elected another Congress that
would have. Yet, 1983 is not 1970. Industries and environmental
groups are sadder, but wiser, in the knowledge of their vulnerabil-
ity to mutual frustration. The average voter may be less naive,
and Congress's image may be a little more tarnished. Perhaps
there is a convergence of interests that may now make possible a
rules approach to air pollution. And perhaps a good place to start
is acid rain, with legislated limits on sulfur emissions from large
power plants and other boilers.
The legislative process alone may not be able to escape the
seduction of goals statutes. Perhaps there ought to be a judicial
number of the cases cited in this Article, but I want to specifically acknowledge both
my involvement in this controversy as well as that in the following paragraph).
New York City Mayor Edward Koch has said that, as a member of Congress, he
voted for placing requirements on state and local officials without sufficient consider-
ation of the implementation problems. "When you are a member of Congress and
you are voting a mandate and not providing the funds for it, the sky's the limit."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1980, at B3, col. 2. The predictable switching of position, de-
pending upon whether politicians are promising benefits or having to deliver upon
them, was evident in the dispute over implementation of the New York City Trans-
portation Control Plan. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2nd
Cir. 1976). While the New York Congressional delegation joined in the overwhelm-
ing endorsement of the 1970 Act, ex-Congressman and later Governor Hugh Carey
was found to be in violation of his duties under the plan and the New York City
delegation vigorously opposed implementation of some parts of the plan that had
previously been adopted by the State and City, particularly a strategy to place tolls on
certain bridges to raise funds to subsidize mass transit. The one member who made
any public statement that lent any support to implementation of that strategy was
Jonathan Bingham, who favored tolls on certain bridges, but not those that connected
with his district. Letter to the Editorfrom Cong. Bingham, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1977,
at L30, col. 3,
See also J. QUARLES, supra note 51, at 166-74. In the words of John Quarles,
ex-General Counsel, and Deputy Administrator of the EPA, such a piece of legisla-
tion "thus provides a handy set of mirrors-so useful in Washington-by which a
politician can appear to kiss both sides of the apple." H.R. REP. No. 410 (pt. 2), 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979) (quoted in dissenting view of Rep. Corcoran).
455. See, e.g., D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 113
(1976) ("classic American tendency ... to reduce the possibility for conflict by in-
creasing the supply of resources"); Ingram, Laney & McCain, Water Scarcity and the
Politics of Plenty in the Four Corners States, 32 W. PoL. Q. 298, 302-03 (1979).
456. Demagogy is the pursuit of power through riling passions and prejudices
against something. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 598 (rev.
ed. 1968). The demagogue characteristically takes no responsibility for what he sup-
ports, but makes extravagant promises of what will be in the future. The 1970 Act
was of course against what is undesirable and otherwise tended to avoid choices.
826 UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:740
check on the use of goals statutes, such as through a reinvigoration
of the doctrine against a delegation of legislative power.457 If goal
statutes were prohibited, legislators and the electorate would then
have to choose between rules statutes or no statute at all. The
Supreme Court's long-standing theoretical adherence to the
nondelegation doctrine and its seemingly infrequent use may be
put in a new light by the Clean Air Act experience. 458 Broad dele-
gation is supposedly essential for Congress to pursue important
social objectives in areas such as pollution control,45 9 but the re-
cent experience suggests that the availability to Congress of a
goals statute approach may render Congress incompetent to make
hard choices or enact effective solutions. 460 Felix Frankfurter and
James Landis once said the nondelegation doctrine is a "jejune
abstraction, ' 46' but the clean air experience suggests that delega-
tion undercuts accountability in the legislative process, creates un-
accountable power in the executive branch, and strains the
judicial role. Finally, it has been argued that there is no way to
distinguish delegation from proper legislation without requiring
the legislature to do the impossible job of anticipating all ques-
tions in advance,462 but the distinction between goals statutes and
rules statutes may provide a tool to force Congress to face the is-
sues without having to look into a crystal ball.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Clean Air Act experience suggests that Congress should
prefer rules statutes to goals statutes in dealing with air pollution.
Goals statutes require cumbersome procedures to generate con-
457. I am in the course of writing an article on the delegation issue framed in
terms of the rules versus goals distinction rather than efforts to measure the quantum
of power conferred.
458. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), are the only two cases where the Court has
explicitly invoked the doctrine to strike down statutes. But, the Court has never ex-
plicitly disavowed the doctrine and it was treated as vital by a majority of the Court
in a recent case, Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980), in which Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Powell invoked the doctrine to
narrowly construe a statute and Justice Rehnquist would have invoked the doctrine to
strike down the statute.
459. See Stewart, supra note 60, at 1669, 1693-97.
460. "Far from detracting from the substantive authority of Congress, a declara-
tion that the first sentence of § 6(b)(5) of the OSHA constitutes an invalid delegation
to the Secretary of Labor would preserve the authority of Congress." Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
461. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Con-
tempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 1010, 1013 n.ll (1924).
462. Eg., Stewart, supra note 60, at 1695-97.
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trols on conduct, while rules statutes themselves contain standards
of conduct. Goals statutes tend to put the issue fortuitously, leav-
ing difficult conflicts unresolved, while the process of formulating
rules requires facing the conflicts. Rules of conduct lend them-
selves to enforcement because they are based on compromise and
presumptively ought to be obeyed as a matter of principle as well
as legality.
A rules approach to a problem so complex as air pollution
would not be simple, but it would be much simpler than a goals
approach. Controls under rules statutes would have to be of more
general applicability than under a goals statute, if for no other
reason than to conserve the legislature's time. Moreover, each ap-
plication of a rule not only settles that case but also offers gui-
dance to the settlement of other cases, thereby avoiding the need
for formal consideration of many particular situations. A goals
statute, by contrast, requires the consideration of many sources
when the controls are promulgated to achieve the legislated goals.
That complex decision is only the beginning. Time will necessar-
ily bring conflict between the promulgated controls and the legis-
lated goals requiring adjustment of the controls in some or all
cases. Congress could decide that controls promulgated may not
be changed for a specified period of time,463 but such a scheme,
although perhaps desirable, adds yet another layer of
complication.
Goals statutes can offer seemingly comprehensive solutions,
but they often avoid the most pressing aspects of the problem and
fail to resolve the problem at large. Rules statutes do not preclude
additional legislation and, indeed, make it likely that future legis-
lation can be more mature.
Goals statutes' procedures are the least studied aspects of the
legislation prior to enactment and thus tend to be the repository of
false resolutions. Unworkable procedures force others to do what
the legislature failed to face, and the delegates are without Con-
gress' means to reach resolution.
Finally, goals statutes create relatively unaccountable
power-in legislators who might fight to enact the most seemingly
pleasing goals, in executive branch officials who might use their
discretion to allocate regulatory burdens as a tool in partisan
struggles, or in private litigants who might use their substantial
power over which public duties are fulfilled to advance private
agendas.
The rules statute approach to air pollution would entail the
enactment of limits and/or taxes on emissions or emissions-induc-
463. Pederson, supra note 57, at 1095.
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ing activity. The rules approach would be piecemeal, establishing
rules from time to time, some at the federal level and some at the
state or local level. The political process being what it is, one
could not hope that the priority of action in a rules approach
would be altogether logical. It probably will have some rough
correspondence to popular perceptions of the risks and costs.
Popular desires may shortchange the interests of future genera-
tions to some extent. Yet, there is little to suggest that the low-
visibility workings of the goals approach have any particular re-
gard for posterity. The supposedly comprehensive Clean Air Act,
which was to deal with all risks, has been unable to cope ade-
quately with air pollution problems that pose threats for the pres-
ent and the future. Rules statutes are an imperfect approach, but
far better than the alternative.
